cause which he has before decided, while sitting in a subordinate judicial tribunal." See 6 Wend. 158. The judiciary article of 1870 put an end to this practice. The Chancellor seemed to have no sensitiveness about appeals from his decrees. In Tripp v. Cook, 26 Wend. 155, he said "appeals should be allowed in every case not mani festly frivolous," and that this " was the only mode in which the Court of Chancery could be preserved." In Beach v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wend. 238, he gave his opinion that appeals should even be allowed from his discretionary orders. The article on Walworth in Appleton's Cyclopedia of American Biography, evi dently written by William L. Stone, or copied from his " Reminiscences of Sara toga, " declares that he "may justly be re garded as the great artisan of our equity laws"; calls him "the Bcntham of Amer ica"; states that "before his day the Court of Chancery in this State was a tribunal of ill-defined power, of uncertain jurisdiction, in a measure subservient to the English Court of Chancery in its procedure"; and claims that " he abolished much of that subtlety, many of those prolix and bewilder ing formalities, " and made rules which greatly improved the practice. This eu logy, by one who was not, a lawyer, appears to me to be a great exaggeration, and to have been written without reflection on the fact that James Kent sat in that chair for fourteen years previously. What is there claimed for Walworth as a reformer of the machinery of the court may be granted: he made excellent rules, and with the in crease of business he undoubtedly extended the jurisdiction and developed the authority of the court. But it is grossly unjust to be stow on Walworth the praise which is due to Kent as " the great artisan of our equity laws." Kent formed our equity system, and Walworth built upon his foundations to a large extent. It cannot be denied that Walworth had a creative and constructive
mind, and that he might have done what Kent did if it had been necessary and the opportunity had offered; but to speak of him as the originator of our equity system is too much praise. What he contributed to this office were an indomitable industry, an alert intelligence, profound learning, irre proachable integrity, and an ardent desire to do justice. To attain justice he had cer tain unconventional ways of his own, and a disposition to see and hear for himself rather than trust to the affidavits and sched ules. So he insisted on having " the widow Van Bummell " in court, although counsel agreed that she " had nothing to do with the case." So he would " take a view " of a person alleged to be of feeble mind. Access to him was easy, and he was not inclined to entangle himself in red tape, like a judicial Lady of Shalott. He was especially solicitous about the rights of widows and orphans, and his guardianship of them was no formality. In their case he was quite apt to do equity after the easy and direct fashion of an absolute eastern monarch sitting' in his palace gate in the olden time. His exaltation of this paternal attribute of his office was a characteristic which should render his name ever honored. William Kent said of him: "No court was ever under the guidance of a judge purer in character or more gifted in talent than the last chancellor of New York." In the last argument made before him by Murray Hoff man, in the last days of the court, that emi nent man said : " Apart from the prevalence of pure religion, the patriot can breathe no more useful prayer for his native State than that the future administration of justice may be distinguished for intelligence, learning and integrity such as has illustrated the Court of Chancery from the days of Robert R. Livingston to the present hour. It must be a source of consolation to yourself, as it is of gratification to your friends, that the robe of justice, transmitted from the illustri ous men who have gone before you, has
