vided for retreat, was not bound even to try to run away. Mr. Bishop, who is always original, scouts the doctrine of retreating (as does Wharton), and holds that one failing to resist a murderous attack and endeavoring to get away is guilty of misprision of felony! The states of Iowa and Alabama are prominent adherents to the old dogma of the necessity of re treating. In State v. Donnelly, 69 Iowa, 705; 58 Am. Rep. 234, it is held that where one is felonious ly and dangerously assailed, he is bound to retreat if he can do so without danger; citing People 7'. Sul livan, 7 N. Y. 396, and cases from Georgia, Missis sippi and California. (The doctrine of the Sullivan case is that " the right to defend himself would not arise until he had done every thing in his power to avoid the necessity of defending himself." In Shorter v. People, 7 N. Y. 193, the court said, "After a conflict has commenced, he must quit it, if he can do so in safety, before he kills his adversary; but this was obiter because the assault by the deceased was only with the naked hand, and the defendant pursued him with a deadly weapon; so the question of retreat was not involved.) The Alabama court carries the duty of retreating to extreme length. Thus in Lee v. State, 92 Alabama, 15; 25 Am. St. Rep. 17, it was held that one must retreat even from his own land, if beyond the curtilage; and in Martin v. State, 90 Alabama, 602; 24 Am. St. Rep. 844, it was held that when one assailed in his own house retreated from it, he lost the protection of his "cas tle," and must continue his retreat and could not de fend himself with a deadly weapon unless it appeared to be reasonably necessary to avoid great bodily harm. But there is an important and increasing line of recent decisions which deny that one thus assailed must retreat at all, and hold that he may " stand his ground." In Runyan v. State, 57 Indiana, 80; 26 Am. Rep. 52, the court said : " A very brief examination of the American authorities makes it evident that the an cient doctrine, as to the duty of a person assailed to retreat as far as he can before he is justified in re pelling force by force, has been greatly modified in this country, and has with us a much narrower appli cation than formerly. Indeed the tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly against the enforcement of any rule which requires a person to flee when assailed, to avoid chastisement or even to save human life, and that tendency is well illustrated by the recent decisions of our courts, bearing on the general subject of the right of self-defence. The weight of modern authority, in our judgment, estab lishes the doctrine that when a person, being with out fault and in a place where he has a right to be,
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is violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel force by force, and if in the reasonable exer cise of his right of self-defence, his assailant is killed, he is justifiable." And so a charge that "before a man can take life in self-defence, he must have been closely pressed by his assailant, 'and must have re treated as far as he safely or conveniently could, in good faith, with the honest intent to avoid the vio lence of the assault," was held error. This doctrine is reiterated by the same court in State -'. Page, 40 N. E. Kep. 745, where the duty of retreating is lim ited to cases of non-felonious assaults and mutual broils and combats. The court observe : — "But if applied to all cases where a person going his lawful way is assaulted, without reference to the question whether a felony or a mere trespass on the person is man ifestly intended, it (the duty of retreat) would require a man to flee before another who murderously assailed, or a traveler to flee before a highway robber, or a woman to flee before her would-be ravisher, before resorting to extreme measure of defense. It is safe to say that the law puts up on a person no such necessity. The old writers on ' justi fiable homicide ' — that is, homicide committed in the re sistance of felonies — make no mention of the duty of re treating." The same doctrine was adopted by the Ohio su preme court, in Balker v. State, 29 Ohio St. 184; 23 Am. Rep. 731, where the subject is learnedly exam ined, and the decision was that where a person in the lawful pursuit of bis business, and without blame, is violently assaulted by one who manifestly and ma liciously intends and endeavors to kill him, the per son so assaulted, without retreating, although it be in his power to do so without increasing his danger, may kill his assailant if necessary to save his own life or prevent enormous bodily harm. The court re mark : " We can safely say that the rule announced is at least the surest to prevent the occurrence of occa sions for taking life; and this by letting the wouldbe robber, murderer, ravisher and such like know that their lives are in a measure in the hands of their intended victims." It has even been held that the person threatened may assume the defensive-offensive and make his as sailant retreat in case of reasonable apprehension. So the Michigan supreme court, in Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 177, held : " If any forcible attempt is made, with a felonious intent against person or property, the person resisting is not obliged to retreat, but maypursue his adversary, if necessary, till he finds him self out of danger." This was followed, People v. Dann, 53 Mich. 490; 51 Am. Rep. 151, when the deceased came armed upon the defendant's premises to take away property purchased by him at an invalid execution sale. In Kentucky the courts go still further, and hold,
