The Supreme Court of Maine. fact to the jury leaves nothing to be desired in point of clearness and comprehension. He has a mind as transparent as a sheet of plate glass. It is achromatic, and whatever is seen through it is seen in its true light, and free from prismatic hues. He is something more than a judge; he has a judicial mind, and has moderation and common sense, and the power of seeing both sides. The result is, he is trusted. He has, withal, the confi dence of his associates on the bench and of the community. To be believed to be such is the crown of success, as Mr. Choate has well said. To his abundant learning, his unques tioned ability and integrity, and his genial manners I should add the possession of a rare tact in conducting a trial. "By this," said his predecessor, Chief Justice Appleton, "his adverse rulings are made more satis factory to the losing party than the favora ble ones of anybody else to the winning party." In his wise and firm administration of the "whole learning of the law " he has made it his business not to suffer justice to the liti gant, that unvarying goal, to be overcome by any technicality. His love of equity has, however, never been a morbid sentiment leading to a blind sacrifice of the principles of law, resembling in this, as in many other respects, that lovable character, Chief Justice Mellen. Of his written opinions, it may be said that they are valuable acquisitions to all branches of the law by reason of their strength, soundness and depth of research. Nothing issues from his pen that is not fin ished and perfect. Like polished gems they shed light upon whatever they touch. His style of writing is always strong, clear and accurate in statement. He possesses an ease which, with an exquisite touch, ren ders ordinary common-place things and characters interesting from their truth of the description. At times he rises above the level of the cold judicial style. A good ex
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ample of this, and of his predominating love of justice, is found in Gross v. Rice, 71 Maine, 241, which holds that a statute is unconstitutional that requires, " No convict shall be discharged from the State prison until he has remained the full term for which he was sentenced, excluding the time he may have been in solitary confinement for any violation of the rules and regulations of the prison." From the opinion by Judge Peters I make an extract: "Although the process author ized by the statute and prison rules for prison discipline may be ever so just and humane, yet so far as punishment was imposed after (not during) sentence, it was not the process, nor the due process of law demanded by the constitution. . . . What we do say is, that under a sentence of four years a prisoner cannot be held longer than four years; that all punishments must be inflicted upon. a convict during his term, and neither directly nor indirectly afterwards. . . . The common law requires that the punishment of persons convicted of crime shall be definite and cer tain. Praemunire was an exception, as for that offense a convict could be imprisoned during the pleasure of the king. The sen tence must inform the convict as to the kind and duration of his imprisonment. This is too clear to need authority or argument. . . But if this statute is constitutional, then there can be no definite sentences awarded. The will of the warden would in effect control the maximum duration. It is plainly to be seen that, in this way, the warden could ex tend a punishment indefinitely. If he can prolong a sentence a day, he can a week, or a month, or even for years. And that too for transgressions not of an aggravated char acter. . . . "What a wide field this idea of such un limited power over a convict opens into! How uncertain and varying would be the results! How much would be made to de pend upon the good or bad judgment of a warden! How much upon the whim or ca
