476 (riparian owners); Pendergrass v. York Mfg. Co., p. 509 (nonsuit); Turner v. Hallowell Sav. Institution, p. 527 (wills); Atwater v. Sawyer, p. 539 (inn -holders), and Burgess v. Stevens, p. 559 (mortgages, foreclosure).
His opinions in the next ten volumes (77-87) are of the usual variety to be found in courts of common law also having equity jurisdiction, and the topics are those that are of daily occurrence, in and out of court.
One of his best considered and most important cases, which first came to my hands as reporter, appears in the eighty-first volume at page 538. It is Weeks, Ptr. for Mandamus v. Smith, to compel the Secretary of State to restore to his office the "Medical Registration Act" of 1887, as an act regularly approved and in force as a public law. After the passage of the bill by the Legislature it was vetoed by the Governor, whose veto was sustained. It was claimed, how ever, by the petitioner, that it had been approved by the Governor and had become a law and was deposited in the Secretary's office before he had vetoed it. The bill was passed to be enacted March 17, as appeared by the certificate of the presiding officer of each house of the Legislature. Upon it was also indorsed a certificate of the Secretary of State of the same date: "Returned to the Senate by the Governor. Signature refused. Failed of passage over his veto." Above this certificate appeared these words: "Approved, March 16, 1887," and the signature of the Governor, with a heavy line in ink drawn through the March 16, and the name of the Governor.
It became an interesting question at the outset whether the records in the Secretary's office were subject to be controlled by parol evidence. The opinion holds that they can not thus be overturned; and that when they are fair upon their faces, showing no infirmity that would invalidate the record if not explained, they are conclusive of what they purport to be. This result is reached from a full examination of the authorities, both American and English, and from which is also adduced the decision that it is a judicial question, whether an act of the Legislature has been constitutionally passed, to be decided by the Bench from an understanding of public matters, regardless of plea or proof. This case was ably argued by eminent counsel, and the court dismissed the petition, having decided that the act never became a law. This case is quoted by the Supreme Court of the United States in its decision on the McKinley Bill, and its doctrine approved. See Field v. Clark, 143, U. S., 677.
The eighty-second volume contains more than his share of cases, and three that help make the book valuable. Allen v. Maine Central Railroad, page 111, is an admirable opinion for its power of statement, terseness of style and plain application of the law in cases of contributory negligence.
James v. Wood, page 173, treats of the illegal capture of game. Hutchins v. Ford, page 363, finds the Judge at home upon a familiar topic, marine insurance and barratry, in which he holds that a policy written by the Portland Lloyds covers barratry of the mariners, but not of the master when the insured is an owner of the vessel. The opinion is full, covering each point raised, amply fortified with decided cases, and although requiring labor and research, shows an easy handling of the subject, as might be expected. He was one of the committee of judges who formed the equity rules published in this volume. Of his fifteen opinions in the eighty-third volume, one, Webster v. Tuttle, page 271, treats of constitutional law and the quieting of land titles; Morrill v. Everett, page 290, the redemption of land sold on execution, is a well-wrought, finished application of equity law and collateral questions arising in the suit; and Bank v. Maxfield, page 576, discusses commercial paper and the right of national banks to take mortgages.
