THE EXTRADITION OF ARTON.
TWO very important points in the law of extradition were raised before the Queen's Bench division in London at the end of last year. The French authorities de manded the extradition of Arton for certain indictable offenses within the Anglo-French extradition treaty. Sir John Bridge, the chief magistrate, made an order for his sur render, at Bow Street Police Court. Arton appealed to the High Court under the Extradition Act of 1870. Various points were taken on his behalf. But the two with which alone we propose to deal here were, first that the demand for extradition was not made in good faith or in the interests of justice, but from ulterior motives; and secondly, that while the requisition for Arton's surrender was nominally based on larceny and embezzlement, the real intention of the French government was to press him to disclose certain State secrets with reference to the Panama scandals, and punish him if he refused to reveal them. The Court held that they had no jurisdiction to entertain either of these objections. It need scarcely be said that in the following observations we treat them merely as a hypothetical set of facts for the purpose of a legal argument. It must be frankly confessed that there can be no two opinions as to the imperative necessity that if a prima facie case for extradition is made out, the Courts should not in any way concern themselves with the motives of the treaty-power demanding — subject always to the consideration that by Section 3, Subject I, of the English Extra dition Act of 1870, a fugitive criminal is not to be surrendered, " if the offense in respect of which his surrender is demanded is one of a political character, or if he prove to the satisfaction of the police magistrate or
the court before whom he is brought on habeas corpus, or to the Secretary of State, that the requisition for his surrender has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him for an offense of a political character." Arton's case clearly could not be brought within the first part of this provision, the offense for which his extradition was de manded was not one of a " political charac ter." But could it not be said that, assum ing his allegations to be correct, it was in tended to "try or punish him for an offense of a political character." The Court an swered these questions in the negative for two reasons: first, that the extradition act did not contemplate the case of an offense not yet committed, and secondly, that even if Arton's allegations were true, they did not disclose any " offense of a political charac ter," for which he was to be tried or pun ished. Suppose that Arton's story was true. He was to be called upon to disclose secrets which he would refuse to reveal. His refusal would be contempt of court. Contempt of court is an "offense." Moreover, if the procedure by way of contempt is put in motion for political objects, the offense is invested with a " political character," and if the extradition is demanded, with the cer tainty of his punishment for such contempt in contemplation, it might be contended that it is demanded "with a view to punish him for an offense of a political character." We admit that this is a strained, and perhaps not legally sound construction of the Act. But assuming such a case as we have dealt with to arise, it would inflict a distinct defeat upon the intention of the Legislature (which was to prevent a foreign government from strik ing at its political opponents through the extradition procedure) if the requisition for
