York; Hickey v. Taafe, 105 N. Y. 26, 36. See also to the same effect, Glover v. Dwight Manuf. Co., 148 Mass. 22; 12 Am. St. Rep. 512; Kehlerz'. Schwenk, 151 Pa. St. 505; 31 Am. St. Rep. 777 (child of 14); Rummel v. Dilworth, 131 Pa. St. 509; 17 Am. St. Rep. 827 (boy of 17); Tagg v. McGeorge, 155 Pa. St. 368; 35 Am. St. Rep. 889 (boy of 13); Smith v. Irwin, 51 New J. L. 507; 14 Am. St. Rep. 699 (boy of 17, a circular saw case), where a charge that "unless the instructions and precautions given are so graduated to the youth, ignorance and inexperience of the servant as to make him fully aware of the dan ger to him, and to place him in substantially the same position as if he were an adult," the master's duty is not discharged, was approved; and to the same effect are Chicago, etc. Co. v. Beinnegar, 140 Ill. 234; 33. Am. St. Rep. 249; Texas, etc. Ry.Co. v. Brick, 83 Tex. 598 (child of 19); New Albany, etc. Mill v. Cooper, 131 Ind. 363 (child of 19); King v. Ford Lumber Co. 93 Mich. 172 (child of 13); Mayw. Smith, 92 Ga. 96; 44 Am. St. Rep. 85 (child of 17); Cleveland Rolling Mills Co. v. Corrigan, 46 Ohio St. 283; 3 L. R. A. 385 (boy of 14); Whitelaw v. Memphis R. Co. 16 Lea, 391; Jones v. Florence Min. Co., 66 Wisconsin, 268 (boy of 15). In the Ohio case above, it was said, after a careful review of authorities : — "It may be safely laid down as a general rule, supported by authority, that persons who employ children to work with or about dangerous machinery, or in dangerous places, should anticipate that they will exercise only such judgment, discretion and care as is usual among children of the same age, under similar circumstances, and are bound to use due care, having regard to their age and inexperience, to pro tect them from the dangers incident to the situation in which they are placed; and as a reasonable precaution, in the exercise of such care, in that behalf, it is the duty of the employer to so instruct such employees concerning the dangers connected with their employment, which from their youth and inexperience they may not appreciate or compre hend, that they may, by the exercise of such care as ought reasonably to be expected of them, guard against and avoid injuries arising therefrom." On the other hand, in Foner v. Phillips, 39 Ark. 17; 43 Am. Rep. 264, it was held to the contrary in the case of a minor of 14, the Court saying of the duty to warn : "A very anxious, careful and humane man would do that, but it is not the usual course." The Court cited Thompson on Negligence, but did not cite him far enough. This is the strongest case on the point, but its reasoning is not extended, nor sat isfactory. A case sometimes cited on this side is Hickey v. Taafe, 105 N. Y. 26, but it is not in point, because the employee (14) " had acquired the infor mation in fact from the best of all teachers, that of practical experience," by six weeks' work on the machine, and getting her hair caught in it. This was followed in White v. Letterman Lith.Co., 131 N. Y.
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631 (child of 13), and in Ogley v. Miles, 139 N. Y. 458 (child of 16). This is the precise doctrine of Greenway v. Conroy, 160 Pa. St. 185; 40 Am. St. Rep. 715 (boy of 14, with six months' experi ence). This was also the case in Buckley v. Gutta Percha etc. Co. 113 N. Y. 540 (child of 12), and in addition, the accident came not from working on the machine, but from slipping, falling on it, and instinctively thrusting out a hand to recover himself. The Court said : " His injury did not come from any ignorance of the machines or of the danger to which he was exposed, but it came solely from the accident." In Crown v. Orr, 140 N. Y. 450, the infant was 19, and the Court said, obiter, that he took the risks like any other servant, which were known to him or ob vious to persons of ordinary intelligence; but the de cision went on the ground that the injury came from his engaging in an act for which he was not employed, at the request of a fellow servant. At first blush, Ciriack v. Merchants Woolen Co. 146 Mass. 182; 4 Am. St. Rep. 307; 151 Mass. 152; 21 Am. St. Rep. 438; 6 L. R. A. 733, might seem to modify the older Massachusetts doctrine, but on scrutiny it will be seen that it does not. Here the boy was 12, and was hurt while going between machines to look for a tool, not in the regular line of his employment, but on order of his superior. There was a verdict for the plaintiff. It appeared that he had been employed in the same two months, and stress was laid on this fact, the Court observing that there was no reason to suppose that explicit instructions about the danger of touching the wheels " would have added anything to what he must fairly be presumed to have known at the time of the accident." A new trial was granted, and a second verdict was rendered for the defendant. On the new trial it appeared that the infant was of less than the ordinary in telligence, and that the place was dimly lighted. The Court remarked, that in hiring a boy of 12, of average intelligence, it is not necessary to tell him that fire will burn, or a sharp instrument will cut, or teeth of cog wheels will crush his hand, if it is put in the way. But stress was laid on the facts that the child had never been in that particular place before, was ordered there imperatively in haste, and that " he had had no instruction, and it is not clear that he had had any observation or experience which showed the danger that in getting down and looking under the machine, and getting up again, some part of his clothing might come in contact with the gearing and be caught, and draw his hand or arm between the wheels." So if on the first hearing the Court seemed to swerve from the former Massachusetts doctrine — which is by no means certain — it is apparent that they came back to it on the last. There is nothing in the later Massachusetts cases to indicate any modification of the early rule.
