Nicholas Hill. defendants that the action could not be sus tained, because there was no connection, transaction or privity between them and the plaintiff. Mr. Hill, in his brief, laid down the prop osition that affixing a false label to a poison and sending it into the market in that condition, so as to mislead others and en danger human life, was an unlawful act for which the defendant was responsible whether he did it willfully or negligently, and that to entitle the aggrieved party to sue in such case, no privity was necessary, except such as is created by the unlawful act and the consequential injury, privity of contract being out of the question; that the injury was not rendered too remote to sustain a recovery because separated from the unlaw ful act by intervening events, however numerous, provided they were the natural and probable consequences of the act; that is, such as would be likely to follow and might be easily foreseen; that where the unlawful act was in its nature likely to pro duce the very events which followed, the author of it may be treated as having caused each succeeding event, although they may consist of the acts of third persons; that the false label was not only likely to mislead druggists and others into the mistakes which followed in this instance, but such was its direct and almost inevitable tendency; these propositions were fortified by the citation of numerous authorities both English and American, and were sustained by the Court. The principle established by this case has been followed in subsequent decisions both in .New York and elsewhere, and may now be considered as the settled law of the land. Mr. Hill's brief is remarkable for its clearness and conciseness, as well as the industry shown in the collation and citation of au thorities. The last case argued by Mr. Hill in the Court of Appeals was that of Olcott v. Tioga Railroad Company (20 N. Y. 210), which was not decided until after his death.
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The brief in this case was one of Mr. Hill's ablest. The point which was decided in favor of the plaintiff was that a foreign corporation was within the exception to the operation of the statute of limitations, by which the time of absence from the State was not to be taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of an action against it. Mr. Hill took the ground in his brief that the statute of limitations was to be construed by looking at all its parts, and endeavoring to collect from the whole a uniform, consistent and rational line of poli cy; that the legislative intent or will is to control, irrespective of what was due to the mere proprieties of language or the strict grammatical import of isolated words or phrases; that an intent to do what was unjust, or to discriminate unjustly and with out reason between different cases of a like kind, was not to be ascribed to the legisla ture, unless expressed with irresistible clear ness, and that these doctrines were especially applicable to those clauses in the statute of limitations which purport to save demands, where there has been no opportunity of suing the defendant by reason of his non-residence, absence or otherwise. The Court in this case sustained Mr. Hill's position, reversed the judgment of the court below in favor of the defendant, and overruled the case of Faulkner v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., decided by the New York Supreme Court ( 1 Denio, 441 ). In looking over the reports and the briefs of Mr. Hill, one is impressed with the great variety of the cases which he argued. He seemed equally at home in cases at common law and suits in equity, in actions of tort and actions upon contract. Some of his strongest and most successful arguments were in criminal cases. Mr. Hill was not an orator in the ordinary sense of the word. His manner was cool and unimpassioned. His arguments were not an appeal to the sympathies or prejudices of the court, but were based upon reason
