A Reform in Criminal Procedure.
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A REFORM IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. Kv Champion Bissell. COMMON Law, as distinguished from Statute Law, is the " perfection of human reason." This is not the dictum of the writer; but it has become imbedded in educated sentiment as an axiom. And this conclusion is based not only upon the multiform and long practices of jurispru dence, but upon the very nature of the case itself. The Common Law is the slowly aggregated result of the deliberations of the most learned and upright citizens of the foremost nations of the world. These citi zens, judges of the courts of last resort, have always as a rule been selected by the proper authorities because of their superior abilities and education, and have been so compensated as to set them above bribery. It is, and always has been, the function of the higher judges who make the Common Law, that they not only establish justice, but correct injustice. Injustices are con tinually being committed by courts of nisi prius, where a judge sits to lay down the law to twelve jurymen, who pass upon the facts in relation to their connection with the law; and are as continually reversed and corrected in the higher tribunals, from which alone we derive those precedents and principles which are styled the " Common Law." Such, briefly stated, is the eulogium of the system of jurisprudence, under which the citizens of the two greatest and most enlightened nations of the world lead their lives and carry on their business. And this eulogium has always been deserved since the barons of England extorted from King John at Runnymede that great guarantee of the liberty and rights of- the citizens known even to schoolboys as Magna Charta; and since trial by jury became the right of
every person accused of crime or sued in a civil action. And yet the " perfection of human reason " is very far from being ab solute perfection; since in strict terms there can be no such thing as perfection of an imperfect instrument. Among the great names that illustrate history, "Beaconing from the abode where the Eternal are," none are more renowned than those of scho lars and statesmen who have with greater or less success devoted their talents to the task of law reforms. Of such were Solon, who reformed Grecian law; Ulpian and Papinian, who reformed early Roman law; Tribonian, who reformed the law in the time of Justi nian, commencing the immortal " Institutes" with these masterly definitions. "Justice is the unvarying and perpetual intention to render to every person his due (suiim cuique). Jurisprudence is the in telligent summation of divine and human things; the knowledge of what is just and what is unjust." And since the Common Law came in, that is, the law as established by reason and precedents, and thus distinguished from the Civil Law obtaining on the continent of Europe as established by governmental au thority, the great names of Sir Samuel Romilly and Lord Brougham will suggest themselves as benefactors of humanity in the direction of reform. The diversities of State laws and practice in the United States make sweeping reforms difficult or slow; and the most that David Dudley Field and his colaborers in the State of New York could accomplish was such a codification of pre cedent and practice as should reform the New York juridical system, and serve as an example to other States. Much yet remains, and much probably
