and followed in the opinion. The contrary rule has been laid down in a case where the deceased died suddenly and an autopsy was performed by a physician at the establish ment of undertakers to which the remains had been con veyed, in order to enable the physician to give the certificate as to the cause of death required by law. Cook v. Walley, Col. 27 Pac. R. 950. In the present decision of the Appellate Division the fact that the dissection was unlaw ful is referred to as a material factor of the cause of action. Conversely it would seem that the circumstances that a dissection was authorized either by statute or municipal ordinance would render its performance, if decently and properly conducted, non-actionable." The Minnesota Court cite Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, holding that where one entered on an other's land and dug up and removed the dead body of the child of the land-owner, the latter might recover damages for the mental anguish thereby caused. Unchastity of Witnesses. — A Kansas gentle man kindly points out that in our recent note on this topic we erred in arraigning Kansas, and that the Supreme Court of that State held, in State v. Brown, 55 Kansas, 766, that on a prosecution for rape, where the prosecutrix is above the age of consent, evidence of her reputation as to chastity is admissible on the question of consent. He adds : — "As another authority supporting the general rule on this subject, as stated in the above quotation from your article, see Craft v. The State, 3 Kan. 450. Attention is particularly called to the language of the Court on page 480, which sounds very like a passage from Decameron or Paul De Kock. From the exuberant wealth of illus tration given, the inference is well-nigh irresistible that the Court had been there itself. The opinion was written by the inimitable Chief-Justice Crozier (now deceased), also the writer of the opinion in Searle v. Adams, 3 Kan. 515, known far and wide as 'the hot weather case,' and which, ever since its publication, has been fitly accorded a prominent place among the curiosities in law literature." Our correspondent will accept the Chairman's thanks for pointing out these choice bits of judicial rhetoric, and we cannot refrain from reproducing here the exordium of the " hot weather case," which was as follows: " In this case the irrepressible statute of limitations is again presented for consideration. For some years past upon the disposition of each succeed ing case involving a construction of this statute, it was considered by bench and bar that fiction itself could scarcely conceive of a new question to arise thereunder, but as term after term rolls around, there are presented new questions comparing favorably, in point of num bers, with Falstaft's men of buckram, thus adding to the legions that have gone before a new demonstration of the propriety and verity of the adage that ' truth is stranger than fiction.' With the heat at ninetyeight degrees of Fahrenheit in the shade and the, newspapers teeming with reports of the ravages of
our great common enemy, who, the more effectually to accomplish his double purpose of capturing the imprudent and frightening the timid, has assumed the form of the Asiatic monster, it might be supposed by the unthinking that the consideration of such ques tions would be entered upon rather reluctantly. But we beg to disabuse the public mind of any such heresy. Cases might be imagined where 'smashes' would not stimulate, nor ' cobblers ' quicken, nor ' juleps ' invigorate; but a new question under our statute of limitations, in coolness and restoring power, so far exceeds any and all of these, that when one is presented, the ' fine ould Irish gintleman's ' resur rection, under the circumstances detailed in the song, becomes as palpable a reality as the ' Topeka Con stitution or the territorial capitol at Mineola.' The powers of a galvanic battery upon the vital energies are wholly incomparable to it. So that the consider ation of this case, upon this day of wilted collars and oily butter, should not entitle the Court to many eulogies for extraordinary energy in the fulfillment of its duties." Liquor Sales by Clubs. — The Court of Appeals of New York has just decided the vexed question of the amenability of a social club to the excise laws for furnishing liquors to its members. The decision in People v. Adelphi Club, New York, is that such clubs do not sell, but merely distribute liquors. To the same effect : Seim v. State, 55 Maryland, 565; 39 Am. Rep. 419; Tennessee Club z>. Dwyer, 11 Lea, 452; 47 Am. Rep. 298; Graffs'. Evans, 8 Q. B. Div. 373; State v. St. Louis Club (Mo.), 28 S. W. Rep. 624; Piedmont Club v. Com., 87 Va. 541; Barden v. Club (Mont.), 25 Pac. Rep. 1042; State v. McMaster (S. C), 14 S. E. Rep. 290; Koenig v. State (Tex.), 26 S. W. Rep. 385; State v. Austin Club (Tex.), 30 L. R. A. 500. To the contrary: Com. v. Pomphret, 137 Mass. 564; 50 Am. Rep. 340; Newark v. Club, 53 N. J. L. 99; People v. Soule, 74 Mich. 250; 2 L. R. A. 794. And so under local option laws : State v. Neis, 108 N. C. 787 : People v. Andrews, 115 N. Y. 427. And so when the club was a mere device to evade the law: Rickart v. People, 79 Ill. 85; State v. Mercer, 32 Iowa, 405 : State v. Horacek, 41 Kan. 87: State v. Bacon Club, 44 Mo. App. 86; Ken tucky etc. Club v. Louisville (Ky.) 17 S. W. Rep. 743; State v. Easton, etc.. Club. 73 Md. 97. Inasmuch as the " distribution" by the club is for money, it is difficult to distinguish it from a sale. The brief for the People in the principal case, by Messrs. Eugene Burlingame, District Attorney, and John T. Cook, Assistant District Attorney, is a cogent and ingenious argument, and a valuable rep ertory of the authorities.
