Some Aspects of the Growth of Jewish Law. hedrin at Jerusalem, whose decision in the case was final and conclusive. The decisions of the Sanhedrin had the same authority as the Torah, upon which they were based and which they interpreted. The wisdom of the learned conceived that no law was or could be immutably given for all time, and that some authority must be es tablished to interpret and explain its mean ing, and adapt it to the changes of time and circumstance, and to the varying phenomena of human life. The decisions of such an authority, therefore, were of equal validity with the original law, and could not readily be overruled. Indeed it was a maxim at Jewish law that no Sanhedrin could repeal the ordinances of another Sanhedrin unless it was greater in wisdom and numbers. (Mishnah Eduyoth I, 5; Talmud Babli Megillah, 2 a.) No Sanhedrin could contain more than seventy-one members; therefore it follows that, although another Sanhedrin may be greater in wisdom, it cannot be greater in numbers. This maxim was therefore inter preted to mean that no Sanhedrial decree could be abolished except by a Sanhedrin greater in wisdom and with the consent of all men learned in law; in other words, by a unanimous resolution of all the people. (Maim. Mamrim II, 2.) Such was the weight attached to a decree of the Sanhedrin. The Influence of the Rabbis. In ancient society the patriarch or the shophet was the sole law-maker; after the law was written down the function of the judge was narrowed down to interpreting it; and it was in their function as interpreters of the law that the rabbis contributed greatly to its development. They also performed the work of codifying the law at various times, and thus rendering it more easily accessible and intelligible. They rarely attempted to make new law, although there are some cases on record in which this was done; and even they who assumed this authority did
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not found it upon any inherent right in them to legislate. They made changes on account of great public necessities, or under the stress of sudden changes in conditions, and then suffered the people in the course of time to accept or reject the change or innovation. No one man could lay down laws which would be accepted as binding upon all Israel; no Talmudical doctor would dare to stand comparison with the great law-giver Moses. The decisions of individual rabbis, so far as they diverge from the old law, are binding on nobody else. Even the decisions of the great rabbinical assemblies or Sanhedrin bind only those represented therein. The principle of representation was carried to its logical extreme. For instance, the great Synod of Rabbi Gershom of Mayence, com posed of one hundred distinguished rabbis of Northern Europe, decreed, among other things,that no woman shall be divorced against her will unless she has proven guilty of some offense which lawfully entitled the husband to divorce her; they also decreed that polyg amy should be interdicted under the pen alty of excommunication. These decrees were accepted as authoritative by all the peo ple of the states represented in the Sanhe drin, and afterwards by all who accepted the authority of the Shulhan Arukh. But Maimonides, who compiled his Code of the Law one hundred and fifty years later, entirely ignores them, and states the law to be the same as it was before the decrees of Rabbi Gershom's Synod were promulgated. Old laws were not thus changed; even those men of great authority and learning, whose pre eminence was recognized, exercised but little influence individually in changing the law. Time, which brought about changes in manners and in customs and in thought, wrought the changes in the law. Every le gal decision and every statutory enactment is the result of 'a change of sentiment among the people or the reflection of such a change. It merely states in formal terms what the people have determined the law shall be.
