Hodge v. State, 98 Alabama, 10; 39 Am. St. Rep. 17, a case of homicide. This is much more satis factory evidence than the blundering, bull-headed theories of human detectives, and there is no good reason why it should not go to the jury. Dogs are always candid and honest, and never on the scent of a reward, and they have no pride of opinion. " The more I know of dogs," said Madame de Stael, " the less I think of men." NOTES OF CASES. Accession. — It is held in Powers v. Tilley, 87 Maine, 34; 47 Am. St. Rep. 304, that the owner of trees cut from his land by a willful trespasser, and by him manufactured into railroad ties, and sold to an innocent purchaser, may recover from the latter their value as ties, without any allowance for the increased value put upon the timber by the trespasser. This is the precise doctrine of Strubbee v. Trustees Cincin nati Railway, 78 Kentucky, 481; 39 Am. Rep. 251; Heard v. James, 49 Miss. 236; Gaskins v. Davis, 115 N. C. 85; 44 Am. St. Rep. 439; Franklin Coal Co. v. McMillan, 49 Md. 549; 33 Am. Rep. 280. But in Omaha etc. Co. v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 41; j L. R. A. 236, it was held that in trover for such con version of ore, sold to a third person, the measure of damages is the value when first severed, less cost of raising and hauling to defendant. It has sometimes been held that where the trespass was involuntary and under mistake, the owner should recover only his actual loss, and not the increased value bestowed by the trespassers, except that in coal cases sometimes the cost of digging is allowed to defendant. Beede v. Lamprey, 64 N. H. 510; 10 Am. St. Rep. 426. "The weight of authority, it must be conceded, sustains the rule that where the action is brought for damages for logs cut and re moved in the honest belief on the part of the pur chaser that he had title to them, the measure of damages is the value in the woods from which they were taken, with the amount of injury incident to removal, not at the mill where they were carried to be sawed. Tilden v. Johnson, 52 Vt. 628; 36 Am. Rep. 769, and note, 770; Herdic v. Young, 55 Pa. St. 176; 93 Am. Dec. 739; Hill v. Canfield, 56 Pa. St. 454; Moody v. Whitney, 38 Me. 174; 61 Am. Dec. 139 : dishing v. Longfellow, 26 Me. 306; Goller v. Fett, 30 Cal. 482; Footer. Merrill, 54 N. H. 490; 20 Am. Rep. 151; Railway Co. v. Hutchins, 32 Ohio St. 571; 30 Am. Rep. 629"; Gaskins v, Davis, 115 N. C. 85; 44 Am. St. Rep. 439, and notes, p. 444; 25 L. R. A. 813. To same effect: Ross v. Scott, 15 Lea. 479; Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291; 80 Am. Dec. 617; Coal Creek M. Co. v. Moses, 15 Lea. 300; 54 Am. Rep.
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415; Barton Coal Co. v. Cox, 39 Md. 1; 17 Am. Rep. 525; Blaen Avon C. Co. v. McCulloh, 59 Md. 403; 43 Am. Rep. 560: Franklin Coal Co. r>. McMillan, 49 Md. 549: 33 Am. Rep. 280; Waters v. Stevenson, 13 Nev. 157; 29 Am. Rep. 293; Austin v. Huntsville Coal & M. Co. 72 Mo., 535 : 37 Am. Rep. 446. But this has been denied : Isle Royal Mining Co. v. Hertin, 37 Mich. 332; 26 Am. Rep. 520; Hazelton v. Week, 49 Wis. 661; 36 Am. Rep. 796. And in Gaskins v. Davis, supra, it was held that the increased value added by the drawing of logs to mill belongs to the owner. In Woodenware Co. v. United States, 106 U. S. 432, the rule is stated to be that if the trespass was willful the trespasser is liable for the value at time of demand or suit, but if not willful, the trespasser or an innocent purchaser from him is entitled to a deduction for the increased value which either has bestowed upon the property; if the defendant is an innocent purchaser from a willful trespasser he is not entitled to any deduction therefor. Per Miller, J.
Gambling — Race for a Prize. — The Supreme Court of New York, first appellate division, have held, in People v. Fallon, that a running of horses for a prize or premium offered by a third person is not gambling. The Court said : — "At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and for many years before, it had been held that the racing of horses for purses, prizes or premiums, which were not con tributed by the owners or drivers of the horses, was not a race for a bet or stake, so that it was illegal under the prohibition of the Revised Statute (1 R. S. 672, 55; Harris v. White, 81 N. Y. 532). The Court expressly held in that case that there is a distinction between the words bet or wager, and that which is conveyed by the term, purses, prizes and premiums. As is said, a bet or wager is ordinarily an agreement between two or more, that a sum of money, in contributing which all agreeing take part, shall become the property of one of them on the happen ing in the future of an event at present uncertain. There is in them an element which does not enter into the purse, prize or premium, namely, that each party to the bet gets a chance of gain from the others, and takes a risk of loss of his own to them. One or the other thing must neces sarily occur. "A prize or premium is ordinarily something offered by a person for the doing of something by others, in a con test in which he himself does not enter. He has not a chance of gaining the thing offered, and if he abides by his offer he must lose it and give it to some one of those who contest for it. In a wager or bet there must be two parties, and it is known before the happening of the event that one of them must lose or win. In the giving of a premium there is but one party who can lose, and those who enter into the contest cannot by any possibility lose, although one of them may win. A premium is a reward or recom pense for some act which is done. A wager is a stake
