the guilt of the respondent — condonation is a voluntary and unconditional forgiveness of the offense charged, with full knowledge of the facts, and followed by cohabitation — and collusion between the petitioner and the respondent. The discretionary bars are the petitioner's adultery, unreasonable delay in presenting or prosecuting the petition, the petitioner's cruelty, unreasonable and willful desertion of the respondent by the petitioner before the offense charged, and willful mis conduct or neglect on the part of the peti tioner, conducing to the conduct complained of. The effects of a decree for dissolution of marriage are these : (i ) the wife is entitled to alimony pendente lite, whether she is peti tioner or respondent, unless the Court is of opinion that she has independent means of support, or it seems desirable on other grounds that her application should be re fused (Phillips v. Phillips, 13 P. D. 220). Alimony pendente lite ceases, however, on decree nisi if the suit is tried before a judge alone, or if tried before a jury on a verdict finding her guilty (Dunn v. Dunn, 13 P. D. 19). (2) Under Sec. 32 of the Divorce Act of 1857, amended by Sec. 1 of 29 and 30 Vict., ch. 32, the Court may, on pronouncing any decree for a dissolution of marriage, order that the husband shall, to the satisfaction of the Court, secure to the wife, by a deed pre pared and approved by one of the counsel of the Court of Chancery, such gross or annual sum of money as to the Court may seem reasonable, or order that the husband shall make certain monthly or weekly pay ments to the wife for her maintenance and support during their joint lives. In the latter case, if the husband shall from any cause be unable to make such monthly or weekly pay ments the Court may discharge, modify or temporarily suspend the order, with power to revive the same in whole or in part. ( 3 ) After a decree for divorce, the Court may inquire into the existence of ante-nuptial or post nuptial settlements made on the parties whose marriage is the subject of the decree, and
vary the settlements for the benefit of the children of the marriage, or either of them, though there are no children. (4) After, but not before, the decree absolute (six months after the decree nisi) for divorce, either of the divorced parties may marry again. (5) The Court has a discretionary power to deal with the custody of the children of divorced persons. A petitioner failing to make out a case en titling him or her to a dissolution of mar riage may, if the Court think fit, obtain a decree of judicial separation. The ordinary grounds of such a decree are adultery (in the case of a wife), desertion and legal cru elty. Legal cruelty has been recently defined, in the Countess of Russell's case, by the Court of Appeal. The Court held (Lord Justice Rigby dissenting) that to con stitute legal cruelty there must be a reason able apprehension of danger present or proximate, to life, limb or health. The magistrates' law as to matrimonial causes is contained in the Summary Juris diction (Married Women) Act, 1895, and requires very careful study. It is a consolida tion with material amendments, of section 4 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1878 and 1 886, and shortly put, enables married women ill-treated by their husbands to obtain from justices all relief, short of divorce, which they could reasonably expect. The Act of 1878 empowers any court convicting a hus band of an aggravated assault upon his wife, if satisfied that the future safety of the wife is in peril, to order ( 1 ) that the wife be no longer bound to cohabit, (2) that the hus band make to the wife a weekly allowance of an amount practically limited only by the discretion of the Court; and (3) that the custody of any children under ten be given to the wife. The act of 1886 em powers any married woman deserted by her husband to obtain from justices of the peace, if satisfied that the husband can but will not maintain her, an order that the husband pay her such weekly sum, not exceeding 2/.,
