Life Insurance — Interest. — Several decisions of novelty have been made on this point. In Adams' Adm'r, v. Reed, decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in June, 1896 (36 S. W. R., 568), it was held that where a widow, with two unmarried children and her son-in law, live together as one family, both before and after the death of his wife, pursuant to a temporary and indefinite arrangement between him and his mother-in-law, and he pays no more than a reasonable price for his board, the mother-in-law has no insurable interest in his life. The Court said in part : — "On the question of what is an insurable interest, the text writers as well as the Courts seem to confess an ina bility to suggest an entirely satisfactory answer. At least they say no accurate definition has yet been given. When we look to the cases we find that between husband and wife and parent and child such an interest has universally been held to exist. And when a sister was poor, and alto gether dependent on a rich brother, who supplied her, it was held she had an insurable interest in his life. On the other hand, it has been held that a stepson has no insurable interest in the life of his stepfather (Aid Soc'y v. McDonald [Pa. Sup.], 15 Atl. 439), or a son-in-law in the life of his mother-in.law (Rombach v. Insurance Co., 48 Am. Rep. 239), or an uncle in the life of his nephew (Singleton v. Insurance Co. 66 Mo. 63). In Price v. Supreme Lodge (68 Tex. 362), it was held that the assignee of a policy had no insurable interest in the life of the insured, who was his cousin, and with whom he lived, and upon whom he was dependent for employment and support. Here it is not seriously insisted that, because the relation of motherin-law and son-in-law existed, the one had an insurable in terest in the life of the other, but it is said that relation, coupled with other relations, as shown in the pleadings and proof, created such an interest. We have not been able to reach such a conclusion. A contract of life insurance is one of indemnity. Whatever difference may exist in the numerous cases on the general subject, it is well settled that the beneficiary must sustain towards the insured such a relation as will justify a reasonable expectation of advan tage or benefit from the continuance of his life, and hence of a corresponding loss in case of his death. It is this loss against which indemnity may be lawfully provided. Even in cases where the ties of marriage and blood have been held to create such an interest, the courts have traced the foundation of the right to the previous loss the beneficiary might reasonably be expected to sustain in case of the death of the insured. Certain it is that when such domestic re lations do not exist no right of indemnity can be had by one person against loss caused by the death of another, unless founded on a pecuniary interest growing out of the relation of creditor, surety or the like." But in Carpenter v. U. S.L.Ins.Co. 161 Pa. St. 9; 174 Pa. St. 636, it was held that a young woman, befriended by an elderly man, who sends her to school and pays her expenses, and afterwards sends her to a commercial college to learn stenography and
typewriting, where she remains until his death, has an insurable interest in his life. This seems a pretty strong holding, and one having a tendency to stir up marital discord. Counsel very plausibly urged that "a married man, living with his wife, who manages his household, cannot, without the wife's co-operation or consent, give an adult woman who comes into his family, as a domestic servant, a quasi-parental in terest in his life." On the other hand, in Trinity College v. Travellers' Ins. Co. 113 N. C. 244; 22 L. R. A. 291, it was held that to constitute an insurable interest there must be some ties of blood or marriage, or some con tractual relation, and therefore a college supported by a church has no insurable interest in the life of a member of that church, although he made the appli cation and the college paid the premiums.
Injury by Intoxicated Passenger. — In Gal veston, H. & S. A. R'y Co. v. Long, decided by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in May, 1896 (36 S. W. R. 485), it was held that a carrier of passengers has power, and it is his duty, to refuse to receive or to convey, as a passenger, one whose conduct is such as to lead a reasonably prudent person to antici pate that his presence will endanger the safety or in terfere with the convenience or reasonable comfort of the other passengers; but it has no right to eject a passenger, who, though intoxicated, conducts him self in a proper manner, and it is not liable for an in jury to another passenger which it could not reason ably anticipate. It appeared that a passenger on a railway train, who was somewhat intoxicated, and walked a number of times through the the cars, look ing for someone, though he conducted himself with out offense towards the other passengers, accidentally stumbled over some baggage, and a revolver fell from his pocket and was discharged, wounding another passenger in the foot. It was held that the carrier had no reason to anticipate such an accident, and was not liable for the injury. The Court relied on Putnam v. Railroad Co. (55 N. Y. 108; 14 Am. Rep. 190), some remarks in which fully justify this holding. Indeed there was much better reason for arguing that a drunken pas senger, who had insulted a passenger, as in the Put nam case, should be ejected as dangerous, than that the carrier should foresee that a drunken passenger, who had done nothing improper, would stumble and discharge a pistol in his pocket and accidentally wound another passenger. This case is an appropri ate companion to that one of the alcohol in the bag and the ignition of the celluloid cuffs, which we lately
cited.
