The English Law Courts. Pie Poudre Court, Derby Court of Record. Exeter Provost Court, Kingston-upon-Hull Court, Newark Court of Record, Northamp ton Borough Court, Norwich Guildhall Court, Peterborough Court of Common Pleas, Pres ton Court of Pleas, Romsey Court of Pleas, Southwark Court of Record, Worcester City Court of Pleas. ELECTION PETITIONS.
Prior to 1868 election petitions were tried before committeesof the House of Commons. The impartiality of these bodies was felt to be not above suspicion, and it was considered desirable by the government of the day to create a fresh tribunal for the trial of cases in which political issues of so lively and importanta character were involved. Accord ingly a bill was introduced providing that "election petitions should in future be pre sented in the Court of Queen's Bench, and having been so presented, should be tried by one of the judges of the superior courts, without a jury, in the borough or county, as the case might be, to which the petition related." On Jan. 31, 1868, Lord Chancellor Chelmsford sent a copy of the bill to ChiefJustice Cockburn with a request that he would consult the judges as to "the best mode of providing assistance for the event of a general election, and the influx of peti tions which always follows. " To this letter Cockburn, on the sixth of February follow ing, wrote a reply in which he conveyed to the Chancellor, in the name of the judges, "their strong and unanimous feeling of in superable repugnance to having these new and objectionable duties thrust upon them." The reasons for this repugnance were practically three in number. They cannot be bet ter stated than in the language of the ChiefJustice himself: (1.) "The inevitable consequences of putting judges to try election petitions will be to lower and degrade the judicial office, and to destroy, or at all events materially impair the confidence of the public in the
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thorough impartiality and inflexible integrity of the judges when in the course of their ordinary duties political matters come inci dentally before them. . . . This confidence will speedily be destroyed if, after the heat and excitement of a contested election, a judge is to proceed to the scene of the recent con flict while men's passions are still roused, and in the midst of eager and violent parti sans, is to go into all the details of electioneer ing practices and to decide on questions of general or individual corruption, not unfrequently supported or resisted by evidence of the most questionable character. The decis ion of the judge given under such circum stances will too often fail to secure the re spect which judicial decisions command on other occasions. Angry and excited parti sans will not be unlikely to question the motives which have led to the judgment. Their sentiments maybe echoed by the press. Such is the influence of party conflict, that it is apt to inspire distrust and dislike of whatever interferes with party objects and party triumphs. Can it be expected that, if brought into contact with these strong preju dices and passions, the judicial office will not suffer in the public esteem? that its dig nity will not be lowered, and the veneration which has hitherto attached to it be material ly diminished? " ( 2 .) " In the next place it is to be observed that the functions which the judges are called upon to discharge are altogether beyond the scope of the duties which on accepting the office of judges we took on ourselves to ful fill. We are at a loss to see how Parliament can with justice 01 propriety impose on us labors wholly beyond the sphere of our con stitutional duties, and which no one ever contemplated the possibility of our being called upon to perform." (3.) " I have further to point out that we are thoroughly satisfied that the proposed scheme is impracticable, and that the per formance by the judges of the onerous duties which this bill proposes to cast on
