ment on the ground of superior qualifica tions, because he had served as an assistant to the District Attorney of the United States in the trial of criminals. Very early in his judicial career a woman of reputable ap pearance was brought before him by a police officer, who testified that about eight o'clock in the evening he saw her speak successively with two men. Her explanation was that she resided in an adjacent city, from which she had came to visit her aunt. She found that her aunt had left her former residence, and she was making enquiries of these men to ascertain whither her aunt had gone. The justice found her guilty of the erime of solici tation, and sentenced her to five days in ihe work-house. On a re-hearing of the case the next day he persisted in his sentence, although the young woman's neighbors tes tified to her entire respectability. She was brought before a competent judge and dis charged on the obvious ground that there was no evidence whatever against her. Re porters stated that the justice, on the re hearing of the case, angrily declared that no woman of respectability had any right to be in the street unattended, after nightfall. This the justice denies, and as the case is bad enough on the admitted facts, he should have the benefit of the denial. It may not be unprofitable to contrast the men whose brief judicial careers furnish such incidents as those above mentioned, with the judges whose learning and integrity were conspicuous fifty or sixty years ago. The best of them made mistakes. That was a great truth spoken by a well-known Ameri can lawyer to an English audience, that those who never made mistakes seldom made any thing. As I recall my experience before the judges of that time, their promptness to profit by their own errors as well as by those of their brethren, seems to have been one of their most delightful characteristics. Who that appeared before him will ever forget Samuel Nelson? His whole nature was judicial. His mind was clear — his
knowledge of law and equity profound, and his judgment thoroughly impartial. No lawyer or layman claimed to have a " pull" on Judge Nelson. He would not have wasted words upon one who attempted to approach him improperly — he would have shriveled him with a look out of his honest eyes. And yet he was one of the most genial of men— a child would not have feared to ask him for a favor. His influence in the suppression of litiga tion is shown by an incident related to me by an eminent lawyer who was one of the counsel in the suit in which it occurred. In the early days of the sewing machine there were four parties claiming to own the patents that controlled its manufacture. The liti gation between them had been protracted, angry and very expensive. The final argu ments were to be made before Judge Nelson at his home in Cooperstown. The prepara tion 'had been exhaustive. There were many thick volumes of printed testimony — maps, drawings and models in great number, — and an array of counsel comprising all the lead ing patent lawyers at the bar. It was ex pected that the arguments would occupy several days. At the close of the first day Judge Nelson quietly said to the counsel that " the inven tion appeared to be one of the most valuable ever made—that each one of the four parties, in good faith, claimed the right to control it. The opening of the argument made it clear that very complicated, grave and close questions were involved, which would prob ably have to go to the Supreme Court of the United States for final determination." He had, he said, "been asking himself whether the public interests and those of all the par ties would not be promoted by an effort in which each party should make some con cessions, and so bring about a compromise. To that end he would suggest the postpone ment of further argument for two or three days." From an ordinary judge the suggestion
