Chief Justice Appleton; Judge Hathaway, who became Judge Cutting's associate on the bench; Elisha H. Allen, afterwards minister plenipotentiary of the Hawaiian Islands at Washington; Judge Frederick H. Allen, and Jonathan P. Rogers, Attorney-General, a man of remarkable abilities, and a" bright, particular star in the legal firmament of Maine," who died at Boston in 1846, at the comparatively early age of forty-five years. Of the still younger generation that were his associates at the bar were, ChiefJustice Peters, ex-Gov. Washburn, James S. Rowe, Judge John E. Godfrey, Albert W. Paine, Daniel T. Jewett, ex-United States Senator, still a leading member of the St. Louis Bar, George P. Sewall, and others dis tinguished in the profession, who were his intimate associates. The distinguishing traits and character istics which made him thus prominent at the bar, and many of which reappear in him as a judge, are thus felicitously described by Chief-Justice Peters: — "Judge Cutting, as a lawyer, had great skill in analyzing complicated facts. He had an aptness for organizing the materials of a law-suit, and would marshal them into an array with the care and precision of a veteran handling troops. His mind was methodical and orderly, and his perceptions clear, quick, and very acute. There was a definiteness of thought or action in what he said or did. His mind easily held the track it started upon. The needle-gun had not a more unerring aim. It pierced to the root of the matter, easily discarding all things collateral to a discussion. Not that he did not see all the points involved in an investi gation, for he had a rare ingenuity for nice and refined reasoning in technical cases, when the occasion called for it. He had a good deal of practice at the bar in tax-title cases, where the law is strictly construed to save forfeitures, cases that grew up after the business break-downs from 1836 to 1838, and he exercised the skill and had the
success of a veritable sapper and miner in destroying the foundations of tax-titles which came in his way. Saladin's sword was not sharper than his intellect, in dissi pating to pieces the false structure of an adverse legal argument. He was prompt in seizing upon all advantages afforded by the neglect or mistake of opposing counsel, and, like a sailing-vessel hugging the wind, would often make headway by an adroit appropriation of the forces that were pressed against him. Not that he was not a wideminded man. He showed at the bar and upon the bench that he had abundant stores of practical judgment and common sense. He possessed a thorough knowledge of the principles of the common law, and displayed great acuteness and wonderful readiness in applying them to cases. He was an un commonly safe legal adviser. . . Many of the remarkable cases in the courts of Maine were his victories." He was not among the most learned, but among the best learned of his profession. He was adequately learned, confining his explorations for knowlege to a few well-se lected, rather than to many books, both in law and general literature. He possessed a very clear and accurate knowledge of the subjects investigated by him. He had early imbibed from the very well-springs of juris prudence, a thorough knowledge and appre ciation of legal principles, the mastery of which easily constituted him the accom plished lawyer, judge, and jurist. His name as counsel and attorney first ap pears in the fourteenth volume of Maine Re ports, in the case of Russell v. Babcock, p. 139, a question upon the statute of frauds, decided adversely to his view of the law; but he had the satisfaction of seeing his opin ion on the same question sustained by later decisions. His success in the next case was more immediate and satisfactory, State v. Bishop, 15 Maine, 122. The defendant was indicted for selling lottery-tickets, and the in dictment gave the defendant the addition of
