now before us." . . . He thus comments in Jay v. Carthage, 48 Maine, 358, on the un wise manner of disposing of a case that had been opened to the jury: "And, if the point raised be successful, it will only dis close another instance of the folly of too readily withdrawing a good cause from the jury, and the rulings of the judge at nisi prius, and referring the same for a final de cision to the law court, on a report full of latent, technical objections." What constitutes a valid seal has been a frequent question before the courts. He did not allow the defendants in Woodman v. York and Cumberland R. R. Co., 50 Maine, 550, to escape the obligations of their bonds which bore only a printed im pression of a seal, etc.; for he found its use authorized by statute, and adds : " Here, then, is a substance affixed to the instru ments more tenacious than wax or wafer, adopted and declared by the company to be their seal; and we know of no decision in this enlightened age which declares it to be otherwise." Reference has already been made to his power of sarcasm in the pre ceding volume at page 554, in the case of Simmons v. Jacobs. There was an attempt made in that case to prove that the appear ance of parties by their attorney had been unauthorized, and thereby avoid final judg ment in a long-contested equity case. He thus speaks of the legislation at that time regulating the admission of attorneys to the Bar in Maine : " Dishonesty can hardly be imputed to attorneys, who for years hereto fore have been admitted, under modern leg islation, to practice in all our courts, upon the presentation of a certificate from the selectmen of good moral character, and proof of the payment of twenty dollars each to the county treasurer. Under such legislation, ignorance has been no bar to admission, but dishonesty always has. . . . We do not im peach the omnipotence of the Legislature for creating attorneys, as the world was cre ated, out of nothing; or the power to control
such eccentric orbs within their appropriate spheres. Our province is rather to ascertain their orbits and to harmonize their motions, if possible, with the movements of other bodies." Of the employment of a lobby be fore the legislature in the case of a division of a town, Frankfort fl.Winterport, 54 Maine, 250, he says : " We frequently hear of such persons in attendance, but had always sup posed it was either at their own expense or that of their friends, and are still of that opinion. Undoubtedly all corporations, and towns as quasi corporations, may use all law ful means to advance or protect their rights before any legally constituted tribunal; and for that purpose may employ agents or at torneys, but are restricted to a reasonable number. An assault by storm can be justi fiable only in case of war; a casus belli be fore war is proclaimed will not permit it." I think his raciness of style has never been equaled by any other judge of this court. Nicholas Emery, his predecessor, had some thing approaching it at times, with a gentle ness of mild humor. Judge Emery will long be remembered for the following com ment on women's rights in his opinion in States. Burlingham, 15 Maine, 104: "The whole theory is a slavish one compared even with the civil law. The torch of Hy men serves but to light the pile on which those rights are offered up. The merging of her name in that of her husband is em blematic of the fate of all her legal rights." It was he who, speaking in Woodward v. Shaw, 18 Maine, 304, of a statute making an illegitimate child an heir of its father, said : "Whether it be really calculated to produce a deeper respect for the marriage relation, time can alone determine. It is at least an experiment to do some justice to an unof fending being brought into the world by the ardent original efficiency of man, not under the sanction of the marriage covenant." The fearlessness and independence that he manifested on the bench were never shown better than in the following instance.
