The Supreme Court of Maine. The Court decided, in Marshall v. Oakes, 5 1 Maine, 308, that where a wife commits a tort in the presence of her husband and by his direction, he alone is liable. In the opinion drawn by Judge Kent, he could not refrain wholly from a quiet bit of humor, and proceeds to say, after reviewing some of the authorities : " How carefully the fathers studied the first case in point, recorded in the history of man (Genesis, ch. iii), or some of the subsequently reported cases, where to common observation the woman and wife appears as the prime mover in wrong and mischief, we cannot know and need not discuss. " It was in connection with his opinion in Lemont v. Lord, 52 Maine, 365, an exhaustive examination and discussion in admiralty law, that the late Judge Fox of the U. S. District Court said, "When Judge Kent says, himself, he has in vestigated a question fully and reached a satisfactory conclusion, we all have confi dence in his judgment and perfect integrity of decision." He naively remarks in Barnes v. Hathon, 54 Maine, 129, where the defendant had erected a tomb upon his own land within fifteen paces of the plaintiff's dining and sitting-room windows, " It was certainly not a very cheering or exhilarating prospect which met the plaintiff's vision, whenever he looked abroad "; but held in the opinion that the question, whether the structure was a nuisance, should be submitted to the jury. One of his most considered cases and strong handling of legal principles may be found in Warren v. Blake, ib. p. 279, an oft-cited authority upon the extinguishment of ease ments. Smith v. Grant, 56 Maine, 255, was an attempt to make replevin of a dwell ing-house a substitute for forcible entry and detainer. The owner of the house had given a bill of sale of it and had undertaken thereby to convert his realty into personalty, and the purchaser had ejected the tenant by an action of replevin. The Judge said : "The writ of replevin was never intended as
11
a means of interference with the sanctity of home, and as an instrument to remove sum marily a tenant, until removed by due pro cess of law made and provided for such cases." How far a mortgagor has an absolute vested right, in the methods for foreclosure existing at the date of his mortgage, and can claim that he is not subject to such changes in the method as subsequent legis. latures may enact, has been a mooted ques tion. The question received an able expo sition by Judge Kent in the Ken. & Port. R. R. case, 59 Maine, 10, and is considered one of his ablest opinions. The proceed ing was a bill in equity to reopen the fore closure of a mortgage given by the railroad, and the bill was dismissed. The case was parried to the United States Supreme Court, which decided (14 Wall. 23), it would not take jurisdiction of State judgments — say ing that if the State Court were right in their view of the law as it stood when the contract was made, it is obvious that the mere fact that a new law was made does not impair the obligation of the contract. True v. Telegraph Co., 60 Maine, 15, relates to what are reasonable regulations for transmitting messages, and is among the earliest decisions upon this subject, — hold ing companies to the rule that there is a limit to their power to avoid all legal liabili ties. The opinion contains an elaborate discussion of the principles involved, and is often referred to by other courts with ap proval. The elements of damage caused by taking land for railroad in R. R. Co. v. McComb, ib. 290, is another case fre quently cited. The Green will case (Rob inson v. Adams, 62 Maine, 369), noted for spiritualism as one of the grounds taken by the contestants to the will, who claimed that the testator made her will under the direc tion of spirits, was a celebrated case; and the opinion, sustaining the validity of the will, was among the last of Judge Kent's judicial labors. It was argued with great
