to improve their moral natures instead of subjecting them to the brutal treatment which they now receive in many of our State's prisons and penitentiaries. When human nature shall be better understood by our legislators, the present method of deal ing with criminals will no longer be em ployed, but will be superseded by a far wiser and better one. Of course, I do not profess to have ex hausted this important topic, as that would be impossible in a single article. I think, however, that enough has been written to indicate that the present method of suppres
sing the crime of murder is wholly irrational and ineffectual; and I sincerely hope that this question will be considered by the Legis latures of those States in which the death penalty prevails, and that these bodies will ultimately be induced to repeal the existing statutes on this subject, to the end that the barbarous and inhuman practice which has prevailed therein for so many years may be speedily abolished, and that a more humane and rational policy may be inaugurated, which will be in accordance with modern civilization and enlighten ment.
IMPUNITY OF COUNSEL. ONE of the most remarkable instances on record where the degree of impu nity to which counsel are entitled in the ex ercise of their profession came in question, occurred in the trial of John Cook, one of the regicides. He had acted as solicitorgeneral for the Commonwealth, during that solemn mockery of justice, when John Bradshaw, serjeant-at-law, sat as judge upon his king; and in that capacity he had prayed that speedy judgment might be pronounced against Charles I., whom he styled " the prisoner at the bar." When tried for high treason, he adroitly attempted to excuse himself on the ground that he had no par ticipation in the king's death — not hav ing formed part of the court which con demned him, and having merely discharged, for his fee, the duty of a counsel. And to get rid of the objection that he had de manded the judgment of the court which tried the king, he had recourse to the quib ble, that his words ought to be taken in mitiore sensu, and that it should be presumed that perhaps he meant a judgment of acquit tal! This is his argument, " My Lord, when
judgment is demanded, is it not two-fold, of acquittal or condemnation? If those that then were entrusted with the power of judi cature, if they did not know any law to pro ceed by to take away his majesty, then, de manding their judgment, it doth not appear to be my judgment; and I refer it to the learned counsel, that counsel many times at the assizes and other courts have been sorry that the verdict have been given for their clients, when they have known the right lay on the other side, and so I might in this." And with reference to his acts being only those of an advocate, and therefore inno cent, he said, " My lord, I humbly answer this, to that which seems to be the most material part in the indictment, that we did assume a power; my lords, I did not assume a power. I hope it will not be said that the counsel had any power; eloqucntia in the counsel, judicium in the judges, and veritas in the witnesses Tertullus, that eloquent orator, accused Paul; Paul answered for himself, and it is said, ' Festus being willing to do the Jews a courtesy he left Paul bound;' it was not
