Some Morals for the Ken of the Judiciary. As neither the families of suicides nor the community are benefited by verdicts of " sui cide during temporary insanity," they ought to be abandoned; and as the individual who
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tries to take his life and fails has done no serious injury to anybody except himself, the statutes which make attempted suicide a criminal offense should be repealed.
SOME MORALS FOR THE KEN OF THE JUDICIARY. By a Member of the New York Bar. A GROWING usurpation by the banco of the ancient functions of the nisi prins jury has been of late attracting the attention of jurisprudents and of laymen. There was a period in the history of court procedures when any setting aside of verdicts because of excessive or insufficient damages, when these were untainted with partiality or fraud, would have been regarded with dismay by both bar and populace. But within the past decade the judicial reports of every State in the Union show increasing instances of overriding jury discretion by the bold dis cretion of the judges who in reviewing verdicts clearly substitute their own views of the facts for those of the jury. Moreover, the bench in some instances insert conditions when remodeling verdicts; as for instance, when deciding that a plaintiff holding a ver dict of record on damage amount must pass to a new trial unless he consent to a specified reduction. Probably this kind of judicial usurpation has been urged to greatest ex tremities in New York State more than in any other. Perhaps the most flagrant in stance was reported in the daily " New York Court Journal" during the early week of last November, headed thus: — "Unless Margaret A. Kolsch consents to accept $2,500 from George H. Jewell, a ver dict in her favor against him for $7,500 for breach of promise of marriage will be re versed." The appellate division of the Supreme Court made such ruling in a de
cision handed down yesterday. Miss Kolsch, who is a sewing-machine teacher, sued Jewell for breach of promise of marriage. In the opinion of the Court, written by Justice Ingraham, is the following: "The position of the parties, the pecuniary re sources of the defendant, and the advantages which would have accrued to the plaintiff by this marriage are not such as would justify the allowance of such a sum as damages for a breach of a contract to marry. There was evidence, however, that under this promise of marriage the defendant had seduced the plaintiff, and the conduct of the defendant at the trial was such as would justify the jury in considering it in aggravation of damages. Considering the whole case, the situation of the parties, their methods of life and the conditions under which they lived, we think the verdict is excessive and should not be allowed to stand." A bare reading of the congested premises which forestall the conclusion, " we think the verdict is excessive and should not be al lowed to stand," would seem to suggest a non sequitnr. Here was an admitted seduction under promise of marriage — which act constitutes a felony under the New York criminal code — and the appel late court after agreeing that " the conduct of the defendant at the trial was such as would justify the jury in considering it in aggravation of damage," coldly decide to consider the whole case,— and mind you as
