The Power of Removal from Federal Offices. is by impeachment, and that this proceed ing applies equally to all civil officers of the United States. There is no distinction in favor of any civil officer of the Government. A postmaster, for instance, is as liable to be impeached and removed for official miscon duct as is the President himself. Each offi cer is protected in the free and legitimate exercise of his official functions, subject to removal for incompetency or for criminal conduct only. The manifest intention of the framers of the Constitution was that the officers of the Government should be shielded from all interference by their associates in office, and from all influences calculated to destroy their independence and their fidelity to the trusts reposed in them. While this is true, they are nevertheless held to a strict accountability for their official conduct, and are liable, upon sufficient cause, to be im peached and removed from office. Although impeachment is the only mode of removal expressly provided by the Con stitution, there are many persons who con tend that another one is nevertheless im plied by its terms. In Article III, Sec tion I, it is provided that " the judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior." The necessary inference to be drawn from this clause is, that all other offices are to be held by a different tenure. It also implies, either that in all cases where the term of office is not specified by the Constitution it is to be fixed by law, or that there must be a power to remove where the official term is indefinite. In respect to those offices which are not established by the Constitu tion, but are created by act of Congress, it will be admitted that the power which es tablishes such offices may also prescribe the tenure by which they shall be held; for otherwise the term of every office so created must be uncertain and indefinite. It does not follow, however, that where the term is fixed, the incumbent of the office cannot be removed until the expiration thereof; for
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otherwise great injury might be done by an incompetent or corrupt official, against which there would be no adequate remedy. The writer, therefore, concurs in the opinion that there must be a mode of removal other than the process of impeachment. Let us now inquire where this additional power resides. The first question to be considered is this : Does the power to remove from office belong to the President alone? As a general rule, all primary or prin cipal powers delegated to any department of the Government are expressly described in the Constitution, and only those powers which are incidental are left to be deduced and exercised by inference or construction. It is a well-settled principle that no officer can rightfully exercise any powers which are not delegated to him by the Constitu tion or the statutes. Is it reasonable to think that the men who founded this Government and framed the Constitution intended to confer this kingly prerogative on the Presi dent, — a prerogative which makes him in many respects equal to the Sultan of Turkey — without any direct or indirect allusion to the subject in the text of the Constitution? Such an important grant of power ought not to rest upon mere implication, but should be expressed in direct and positive terms. The writer contends, therefore, that the absence of any express provision in the Constitution, conferring the power of re moval on the President, is strong presump tive evidence that the framers of that in strument did not intend that he should possess and exercise that power. Having thus shown that the President does not possess the power of removal by any express constitutional provision, let us next inquire whether or not that power can properly be regarded as one of his inci dental or implied ones. And this leads us to the examination of that part of the Consti tution which establishes the executive branch of the Government and defines its powers and
