clearly to show that the guilty party had been, or upon a track which circumstances indicate to have been made by him; but that it was error to admit such testimony where it did not appear that the dog had been trained or tested. The dissenting opinion of Guffey, J., shows very clearly the danger attending the admission of such testi mony." The opinions have not come to our notice, but we feel able to point out the superiority of the canine over the human detective : he is perfectly honest and above the influence of a reward. In the instance of a trained and experienced hound, shown to have tracked persons by a scent, there would seem to be as much safety of reliance upon this native power as in the case of detecting poison in the human body by means of known chemical agents, — indeed, rather more, for there is no sort of doubt about that which is produced at the end of the process in the case of the dog, whereas the result of chemical analysis may be influenced by unknown accompaniments.
NOTES OF CASES. Marriage of Divorced Person. — An important decision is made in Re Stull, 183 Pa. St. 625; 39 L. R. A. 539, that the marriage in another State, where it is lawful, of a divorced man and his para mour, who go there to evade the law of their domicil, which prohibits their marriage during the life of the former wife, is not valid in the latter State. The court give no reason whatever for this holding, the nearest they come to it being the bare declara tion that it is "contrary to public policy." They say : — "There is no question as to the general rule that a marriage which is valid by law of the place where it is solemnized is valid everywhere. Of course, even this general rule has its exceptions, where the particular mar riage is contrary to good morals or public policy, or to the positive statutes of the country where it is sought to be enforced. But where a man and woman, citizens of the same State, and subject to an absolute statutory prohibi tion against entering into a marriage contract which is against good morals and contrary to public policy, leave their domicil and enter another for the express purpose of violating the law of their domicil in this respect, the case is highly exceptional, and the great weight of authority is against the validity of such a marriage in the place of their domicil. There have been conflicting decisions upon the question, but very few of them sustain the validity of the relation where it has been assumed for an intended evasion of the law of the domicil and is contrary to good morals." The court cite the exactly parallel case of Pennegan v. State, 87 Tenn. 244; 2 L. R. A. 703, and Brook -'. Brook, 9 H. L. Cas. 212 (the case of marriage with a deceased wife's sister), and Williams v. Cates, 27 N. C. 535 (the case of marriage with a third per son, not the paramour), and a New York Supreme
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Court case since overruled; also, several cases of mixed marriage. On the other hand, the courts of New York, Massachusetts, Maryland and Kentucky pronounce the re-marriage out of the State of the prohibited party valid and effectual, although possibly none of the re-marriages were with the paramour. The going out of the State to evade the prohibition can make no difference, for of course the party could not effectually marry again in the State, and one has a perfect right to evade the effect of the local decree, so long as he forms a marriage valid in the other State. By marrying again in a State where he may lawfully marry, he violates no law of the State where the decree was pronounced. The only valid excep tion to the rule is where the re-marriage is in itself independent of decrees, incestuous, or contrary to the public policy of the State of the decree, as under the English doctrine of marriage with a deceased wife's sister. We do not see what warrant the Pennsyl vania court has for saying: "Upon the foregoing authorities, there is no doubt as to what the law is in England on this subject. It seems to us that these decisions are founded upon impregnable reasoning, which cannot be answered; and these decisions apply with the greatest possible force to the case in hand, for in those cases the statutes did not prohibit mar riages involving immoral considerations," for as we understand the English law, it recognizes the validity of marriages made out of the kingdom, if valid where made, unless incestuous or contrary to the public policy of the kingdom. The marriages in this coun try of persons of different blood proceed upon the theory that they are incestuous and offensive to public decency. This Pennsylvania decision cannot be up held on principle, unless it is conceded that it is wicked for a man to marry his paramour in the absence of a prohibitory decree. This court would hardly go so far, we suppose, as to hold that if the plaintiff in the divorce suit had died, it would not have been perfectly right and decent for the defen dant to have married the paramour, even in Penn sylvania. Such marriages are very common, and, indeed, the prohibition of the decree purports to extend only to the plaintiff's lifetime. Now, if, during the plaintiffs lifetime, the defendant goes abroad and marries the paramour in a jurisdiction where it is lawful for him to do so, and then returns, he comes back a legally married man, and he has broken no law or decree of his State, for that decree is only to the legal effect that he shall not re-marry in the State whose court has pronounced it. In our opinion, there is no escape from the conclusion that he has broken no law of his State by forming a valid marriage outside of it. Danforth, J., in Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18; 40 Am. Rep. 505, said the conclusive word on this subject when he declared :
