"The legal unity of husband and wife has, in Georgia, for most purposes, been dissolved, and a legal duality established. A wife is a wife and not a husband as she was formerly. Legislative chemistry has analyzed the conjugal unit, and it is no longer treated as an element but as a com pound. A husband can make a gift to his own wife, although she lives in the house with him and attends to her household duties, as easily as he can make a present to his neighbor's wife. This puts her on an equality with other ladies, and looks like progress. Under the new order of things, when he induces her to enter into the business of keeping boarders, and promises to let her have all the proceeds, he is allowed to keep his promise if she keeps the boarders. It would seem that the law ought to tolerate him in being faithful to his word in such a matter, even though he has pledged it only to his wife, and we think it does." — McNaught v. Anderson, 78th Ga. 503" I do not know the fact judicially, because as a judge I am a bachelor, but as a private indi vidual I know that a man is no more capable of resisting his wife than he is of resisting himself. Indeed, he is rather less able to deny her suit than to defend against his own. A judgment obtained in amicable litigation by a wife against her husband is mere matter of form. To carry on such litigation is to play a sort of comedy, but we cannot permit these new parties to intervene and convert it into a tragedy. Let the wife plaintiff and the husband defendant coquette at will." — Smiths. Cuyler, 78th Ga. 659. "Before any presumption, not manufactured by the legislature, can mount to the bench, it has to serve for a long season on the jury, and be trained for judicial administration." — Kinnebrew v. State, 80th Ga. 239. "Exemption of homestead may be waived or renounced, but the right to increase the family, whether by marriage or birth, is not the subjectmatter of waiver All that a man has to do after securing a homestead as the head of a family, is to keep on being the head of a family without break or interval." — Nelson v. Com mercial Bank, 80th Ga. 329. "The question is, whether the private parts of females are protected against wounding or dis figuring, or whether the protection extends to males only. It is certain that as to every specific
organ or member designated by name as the subject of mayhem, both sexes are included; then why not both included under the terms, "private parts of another"? It is true that the male alone has the testicles, and only upon him could the statute be violated by castration; but will that difference, or any other difference in the private parts of the two sexes, warrant a con struction of these terms, either to the effect that the female has no private parts, or that they are less sacred than those of the male? Each sex has private parts appropriate to its own func tions; this we know as a matter of fact, and cannot ignore it in exploring legislative intention. It would be simple nonsense for us to hold that in contemplation of law a female has no private parts. And why should we conclude that, having them, they are less protected by law against being injured, wounded or disfigured than those of the male? Whether for the sake of utility or appearance, hers are as much within the letter and spirit of the statute as his." — Kitchens v. State, 80th Ga. 812. "Upon a question of sexual intercourse the experience and sagacity of jurors might very well be trusted to run the general logic of the case; but we do not think that the terms made use of by the court in this instruction invaded their function." — Hunt v. State, 81st Ga. 142. "The plaintiff spoiled the instrument, and then sued the manager because the performer did not make good music. It was the plaintiff's fault that the conductor was out of tune." — Peavy v. Ga. Railroad, 81st Ga. 488. "The bill of exceptions recites that ' counsel for plaintiff in error proceeded to reply to the argument in favor of the nonsuit, but was, almost at the outset, interrupted by the court, who stated that it was unnecessary for counsel for the plaintiff to take up the time of the court, as the court was ' dead-head ' against him, and the court then passed the order.' We know it is frequently the habit of counsel to make the speech long because the case is weak, but we agree with the circuit judge in thinking it needless to do so. That the judicial head was in the mortuary state described by its possessor was a necessary result of the evidence." — Sparks v. E. T. V. & G. Ry. 82d Ga. 169. "A social, genial gentleman, fond of company and a glass, by occupation a cigarmaker, who
