of the South, a majority of the Court, were on one side; the distinctively Democratic judges on the other side. As to the legaltender rulings, it is sufficient to say that those judges who had been attached in earlier days to the Democratic party, or who had accepted the economical and constitutional doctrines of that party, constituted the ma jority at the first decision, holding legaltenders to be unconstitutional; while the judges who had belonged to the old Whig and Republican parties formed the minority; and that this minority was afterwards turned into a majority by the appointment, to fill vacancies existing in the Court, of two judges, whose votes, when the question was reviewed, were in accordance with their political ante cedents. Then we have the strange heresy of a divided Court, that the constitution of the country exempts one-half of its wealth from contributing to the support of the general government. Like the legal-tender cases the income-tax decision reversed the previous ruling of the same Court upon a great and fundamental political question, which was the centre of a hot partisan con troversy. It differs, however, from those cases in that the decisions which it overrules were unanimous and had long been acqui esced in. It will not do to omit the most momentous semi-judicial tribunal that ever held session in this country, when the Supreme Court Judges, who were members, decided accord ing to party affiliations, and thereby awarded to Hayes the Presidency that belonged to Tilden. When we pass from questions of construc tion of the constitution to those of personal liability for political offenses, we find the same exhibition of the political prejudice of our judges, finding expression in their rulingsJustice Samuel Chase, of the Supreme Court of the United States, presiding as circuit judge in the case of John Fries, who was tried the latter part of the last century at Philadel phia for his life, for constructive treason, an
nounced to the defendant's counsel, before argument began, that he had made up his mind that the law was against the defendant. Upon this extraordinary announcement the defendant's counsel retired from the case, and the verdict of guilty, thus secured against an undefended prisoner, was corrected by a pardon from the President of the United States. It may be added to show the bitter partisanship of Judge Chase, that he left the bench without a quorum to canvass Maryland against Jefferson. Judge Underwood, pre siding in Virginia, made confiscation rulings which cannot be surpassed for atrocious dis regard of legal sanctions. Judge Durell, pre siding in Louisiana, issued an order, without a prior argument, directing the United States marshal of New Orleans to use the federal army to crush out a State government which had not only a legal title, but was in posses sion. Judge Bond, presiding in South Car olina in 1876, did not hesitate to release on habeas corpus State functionaries whom the judges of the State Supreme Court had put in prison for contempt in disobedience of a decree of that court. There are not wanting more recent instances of federal judges re sorting to an " encroaching jurisdiction " and "logical cobwebbing " to satisfy partisan de mands. The facts, as conclusively shown by our judicial records, must lead us to conclude, that so far as concerns routine political issues and involving no great stakes, judicial impar tiality may be relied on; but that so far as con cerns cases of exceptional character — these are fortunately of rare occurrence — and involving great political stakes, a judge's judicial opinions will, consciously or uncon sciously, be influenced by his political sym pathies. And in such cases the interested parties are prone to canvass the court, not according to weight of legal learning or con viction or characters, but according to politi cal affiliations. This, in some instances, has gone so far to give fresh point to Selden's old gibe : " We know what judges will do."
