and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, granted to the church. The theory probably was that a spiritual person would be more likely than another to apply the dead man's goods for the benefit of his soul. It followed that the persons who had the administration of an intestate's goods acquired the right to inves tigate any circumstances which would de prive him of the benefit of administration, such as a testament made by the deceased person; and the competence of the church to compel the executor to carry out the testa tor's directions was firmly established before Glanville wrote. Just when the church acquired this jurisdiction over wills and in testacies is uncertain, but it is mentioned in Magna Charta and was spoken of in 52 Henry III as then being of great antiquity. To the fact that this jurisdiction never ex tended to real property, to which the King always succeeded in virtue of his feudal posi tion as lord paramount, is due the anomaly, existing for centuries, that the probate of a will deals conclusively only with personal property. The bulk of the testamentary and admin istrative business was then, as now, chiefly non-contentious. It was transacted by a num ber of spiritual courts or chambers scattered throughout England, the diocesan courts of the bishops, and the courts of the Arch bishops of Canterbury and York. The Court of Delegates was for a long time the court of final appeal. This court was composed of doctors of the civil law and judges, and gave no reasons for its judgments. It was abol ished by 2 and 3 William IV, from which time the judicial committee of the Privy Council was the court of final appeal in all matters governed by the procedure of the civilians. The judges of the spiritual courts were appointed by the prelates or other func tionaries over whose tribunals they presided. They were occasionally lawyers, but more often clergymen. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the principal ecclesias tical business centered around the Doctors' Commons, where a close body of advocates
and proctors enjoyed a monopoly. As part of this system, governed by the procedure of the civilians, the admiralty court now re quires notice. The admiralty jurisdiction is of great an tiquity. It seems to have been an ancient court in the time of Edward I, when we first find traces of it. (Inst. IV, 400.) It was then the Court of the Lord High Admiral of England and was held on shipboard in a sum mary way, velo Ircanto. The first admiralty ordinance of which we have any record was issued by Henry I, and dealt mainly with wrecks. Richard I, under whom were first published the sea laws of Oleron (so called from the island of that name where they were promulgated), speaks of the court of admi ralty as being then a court of record. We have about this time records of the decisions of various naval commanders relating prin cipally to the manning of the King's ships and the punishment of various offenders; but the judicial power of the admiral does not appear to have extended beyond his own command. The first considerable admiralty jurisdiction in ancient times seems to have been exercised by the Lord Warden and Bailiffs of the Cinque Ports, who for many generations dealt with questions arising on the high seas involving the rights of foreign nations and charges of piracy. Questions of charter-party, freight or other contracts" were of course dealt with by the itinerant justices, when the ships of the parties were within the territorial limits of a county. The admiralty jurisdiction was reconstituted on a more definite basis by Edward III. in conse quence of the difficulty in dealing with piracy and with spoil claims by or against foreign sovereigns. The matter was brought forcibly to Edward Ill's notice when he had to pay out of his own pocket damages for outrages committed on his allies, the Geno ese, by his own subjects. When, therefore, in 1340, the battle of Sluys gave him the supremacy of the sea, he established a High Court of Admiralty, un der the Lord High Admiral of England, to
