John Marshall. To "regulate" commerce, said Marshall, is to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed; and he furthermore asserted the proposition, so extensive and beneficent in its future operation, that "wherever com merce among the States goes, the judicial power of the United States goes to protect it from invasión by State Legislatures." The same sound and liberal principle was applied by the Chief Justice as against the right of the States to tax foreign commerce, in the case of Brown against Maryland. Upon these decisions construing the Con stitution rest the navigation and interstate commerce laws of the United States.1 WORCESTER v. GEORGIA. Marshall had devoted a third of a century to the duties of his high office when he came to Worcester v. Georgia, the last of his great opinions. The years had brought to his in tellectual powers, not failure, but fruition. We are not now to look upon the flickering of a feeble light which is about to be extin guished, but upon the effulgence of a western sun, which, though it is soon to pass below the horizon, will continue the guidance of its light reflected. This is not entitled to be considered his greatest opinion, because others involved questions much more vitally affecting the nation. What was the nature of the case? He comprehended it in a sweep ing sentence: "The legislative power of a State, the controlling power of the Consti tution and laws of the United States, the rights, if they have any, and the political existence of a once-numerous and powerful people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be consid ered. Juridical literature does not suggest another whose resources would have been adequate to the production,of this opinion. It is the opinion of the philanthropist, the champion of treaty obligations, the historian of the colonies and of the Revolution, the master of the law among nations, and the father of constitutional interpretation.' 1 Honorable John F. Dillon.
- Mr. Chief Justice Shauck.
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BANK OF UNITED STATES v. DANDRIDGE. THE THOMAS JEFFERSON.
We, of the present generation, are not con cerned to assert that Marshall was always right, or that he has spoken the last word on each and every subject which he dis cussed. Probably his worst mistake, accord ing to our modern notions, is to be found in his dissenting opinion in Bank of United States г: Dandridge, 12 Wheaton, 64, pp. 91-94, 97, 108; where he contended that a corporation can act only by writing. He said, and said truly, that the impersonal entity (the "legal person") has no voice (i. e., no mouth or tongue) with which to speak. Hence he concluded that its will must be communicated solely in writing. He over looked the fact that the impersonal entity has no hand with which to write any more than it has a tongue with which to speak. His view carried out to its logical conclusion, would debar corporations from transacting any business whatever. Indeed it would pre vent the initial step of organizing the cor poration.1 Upon two important points in which de cisions made in Chief Justice Marshall's time have been since overruled, the later de cisions are in accord with the opinions which he finally entertained. The Court, in 1809, in opinions delivered by him, decided that a corporation aggre gate could not be a citizen; and could not litigate in the courts of the United States, unless in consequence of the character of its members, appearing by proper averments upon the record. In Louisville Railroad Company against Letson, in 1844. those de cisions were overruled; and it appears by the opinion of the Court, as well as by a let ter from Mr. Justice Story to Chancellor Kent of August 31. 1844, that Chief Justice Marshall had become satisfied that the early decisions were wrong. In the case of The Thomas Jefferson, in 1825, it was decided by a unanimous opinion 1 Professor Smith.
