John Marshall. Having established his jurisdiction [by Cohens v. Virginia and the cases leading up to it] it remained for the Chief Justice to de fine judicially the powers and develop the resources and hidden treasures of the Con stitution, demonstrate its capacities and adapt them to new relations of social life. He considered many of the most important powers of Congress; he established and sus tained the supremacy of the United States; their right *ks a creditor to priority of pay ment; their right to institute and protect an incorporated bank; to lay a general and in definite embargo; to levy taxes; to pre-empt Indian lands; to control the State militia; to promote internal improvements; to regu late commerce with foreign nations, and among the States; to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy. He dealt with a mass of implied powers incidental to the express powers of Congress; gave life to the clause which authorized the employment of necessary and proper instruments; enforced the constitutional restrictions upon the powers of the States; struck down preten tious efforts to emit bills of credit, to pass f.r post facto laws; to control or impede the exercise of Federal powers, to impair the ob ligations of contracts, to tax national agen cies, to exercise power over ceded territory, to cripple commerce and to defy the lawful decrees of the Federal Courts. He upheld the paramount obligations of treaties, de fined the law of treason, developed the ad miralty and maritime jurisdiction, illustrated the law of prize, extended the application of the principles of commercial law, and placed the law of trusts and charities upon a stable basis. He protected the States in the exer cise of their lawful powers, in their exclusive right to interpret their own Constitutions and local laws, in their freedom from mo lestation under the Fifth and Eleventh Amendments, in their right to levy taxes upon the creatures of their own sovereignty. In United States v. Judge Peters, in the Trial of Aaron Burr, in Fletcher r. Peck, in
251
the case of the Nereide, in McCulloch v. Maryland, in Dartmouth College v. Wood ward, in Sturges f. Crovvninshield, in Osborn г: Bank of the United States, in Gib bons v. Ogden, in Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., in Brown v. Maryland, in Craig ï1. Missouri, in Barren r. The Mayor of Baltimore, in Ogden r. Saunders, and in Worcester v. Georgia, we recognize a mag nificent range of adjudications which bear to our constitutional jurisprudence the relative strength and majesty of the Rocky Moun tains to our physical geography.1 Of all the persons, besides Washington, who were prominent anywhere in the years from 1789 to 1861, there are three who stand out pre-eminent as promoters of the strength and durability of the national government. They are Hamilton, Webster and Marshall. I would not detract one iota from the praise due to Hamilton's constructive and far-see ing statesmanship. Nor would I belittle the stately eloquence and powerful logic of Web ster's anti-nullification speeches. But I be lieve that the unity of the nation, in other words, "American nationality," was advanced more by the decisions of Marshall than by the combined efforts of Hamilton and Web ster. Had it not been for Marshall's work, the Union could hardly have withstood the strain of the civil war. . . . His guiding principles of constitutional in terpretation may be summed up in two famil iar legal maxims. He proposed to construe the instrument, lit res wagis ralcat quant pcreat. And he proposed, in construing the words, to take into account the subject-mat ter of the instrument. He believed that, in order to ascertain the meaning of a writing, we must look not only at the words, but also look at the object of such words relating to such a matter. The question is notwhat might these words signify, if used in some other connection, but rather — what is the inten tion which these words express when used in such an instrument for such a purpose. 1 Professor Carson.
