A Century of English Judicature. itable purpose? Whatever definition is given, if it is right as far as it goes, in my opinion this trust is not within it. I will attempt one. I think a charitable purpose is where assistance is given to the bringing up, feeding, clothing, lodging and education of those who from poverty, or comparative poverty, stand in need of such assistance, that a temporal benefit is meant, being rnogey or having a money value. This defi nition is probably inefficient. It very likely would not include some charitable purposes, though I cannot think what, and include some not charitable, though also I cannot think what : but I think it substantially cor rect, and that no well-founded amendment of it would include the purposes to which this fund is dedicated. * * * I think there is some fund for providing oysters at one of the Inns of Court for the Benchers: this, however benevolent, would hardly be. called charitable; so of a trust to provide a band of music on the village green." For authorities however venerable, if irra tional or founded on doubtful principles, he had scant respect. "I am prone," he once said, "to decide cases on principles, and when I think I have got the right one I am apt (I hope I am not presumptuous), like Caliph Omar, to think authorities wrong or needless." He was well equipped with selfconfidence. "Lord Cairns was a great law yer and a consummate judge," he said in one case, "but I differ with him unhesi tatingly." He was too tenacious of his per sonal opinions, some thought. The view that posting acceptance of an offer which never reaches the offerer constitutes a con tract, is one of the doctrines to which he never would assent. (British and American Tel. Co. r. Colson, 6 Ex. 118; Household Fire Insurance Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. D. 216). It is often amusing to observe his efforts to enforce his favorite views. In the Memberv case his discussion of the doctrine г-olenti non fit injuria was really unnecessary to the determination of the issue. This is
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the way he introduces it: "Of course it is in a sense not necessary that I should ex press an opinion on this, as the ground I have just mentioned, in my opinion, disposes of the case. But it, instead of mentioning that ground first, I had mentioned the one I am now dealing with, it would, on the same reasoning, be unnecessary to mention that. What I am saying is not obiter, not a needless expression of opinion on a matter not relevant to the decision. There are two answers to the plaintiff, and I decide against him on both, one as much as the other. On the occasion of his retirement from the bench Baron В ram well said: "I can hon estly say that if I had my choice of being a great judge or a good judge, I should un hesitatingly choose the latter." He was both.1 1 Baron Bramwell's principal efforts are : Derry г/. Peek, 14 A. C. 337 (deceit); Jackson z». Insurance Co., ю C. P. 25 (marine insurance); Hall v. Wright (breach of promise); Bullen v. Sharp, I C. P. 86 (partnership); Debenham v. Mellon, 5 Q. B. D. 394 (wife's neces saries); Kankin v. Patter, 6 E. and I. App. 131 (marine insurance); Reg. г». Druitt, loCoxCr. Cas. 592; Commrs. of Income Tax v. Pemsel (1891), A. €.531 (charity); Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor (1892), A.C. 25 (con spiracy); Mills v, Armstrong, 13 A. C. (negligence); Capital and Counties Hank-/. Henty, 7 A.C. 741 (libel); Degg v. Midland Ry. I II. and V. 781 (master and ser vant); Jones v. Tapling, 31 L. J., C. P. 342 (easements); dray г». Carr, 6 Q. B. 522 (shipping); Hammersmith Ry. v. Brand (damage for vibration); Bryant z>. Foot, 3 Q. B. 497 (prescription); Rodocanachi v. Elliott, 9 C. P. 578 (marine insurance); Mullinger r. Florence, 3 Q. B. D. 484 (liens); Clark v. Molyneux, 3 Q. B. D. 237 (libel); Massam v. Cattle Food Co., 14 Ch. D. 763 (trade name); Honck v. Muller, 7 Q. B. D. 92 (sales); Sewell?'. Burclick, ю A. C. 74 (bill of lading); Britton v. Gt. Western Cotton Co., 7 Ex. 130 (master and servant); Duke of Buccleuch v. Board of Works, 3 Ex. 306; Reg. v. Castro, 5 Q. B. D. 507 (criminal procedure); Drew v. Nunn, 4, O. B. D. 668 (agency); Ryder v. Wombell, 3 Ex. 218 (infants' necessaries). Some of his more characteristic opinions as to method and tendencies are : Abrath v. Northeastern Ry., n A. C. 247 (malicious prosecution); Great Western Ry. v. Bunch, 13 A. C. 31 (negligence); Membery v. Gt. Western Ry., 14 A. C. 179; Sullivan г'. Mitcalfe, 5 C. P. D. 469 (company); Salt-'. Marquis of Northampton (1892), A. C. 18 (mortgage); Bamford v. Turnley, 3 B. and S. 62 (nuisance); Bridges v. No. London Ry. (negligence); Twycross v. Grant, 2 C. P. D. 469 (company). His dissents are always vigorous and original. See the following: Bank of England v. Vagliane (1891), A. C. 107 Smith v. Baker, 9 A. C. 187: Household Fire Ins. Co. v. Grant, 4 F.x. D. 216 (contract): Kichez». Ashbury Co., 9 Ex. 224 (company); Jackson v. Met. Ry.. 2 C. P. D. 125 (negligence); Johnson i>. Roylton, 7 Q. B. D. 438 (sales); Gray v. Fowler. 8 Ex. 249 (vendor and purchaser).
