cases previously decided by a higher court, he said: "I will not attempt to distinguish this case from the cases before the Court of Appeal, but I will say that I do not consider them as absolutely binding upon me in the present instance, and for this reason, that as I do not know the principle upon which the Court of Appeal founded their decision I cannot tell whether I ought to follow them or not. If these decisions do lay down any principle I am bound by it; but I have not the remotest notion what that principle is. Not being at liberty to guess what the princi ple of those decisions is, I am only bound to foHow them in a precisely similar case; con sequently as the legal decisions do not stand in my way, I dismiss the summons with costs." It is remarkable that so strong and positive a mind should have gone wrong so seldom. In the few cases in which he was held to have gone wrong his errors came from his keen sense of justice or impatience with the law's delays. (See Coventry and Dixon's case, 14 Ch. D. 660.) His complacency was never disturbed by reversals. "That is strange," he said when his attention was called to the fact that the Court of Appeal had reversed one of his decisions; "when I sit with them they always agree with me." Jessel's mental fibre was so strong that it was coarse grained. He lacked the cultivated imagination of such men as Cairns, whom, alone of his contemporaries, he conceded to be his superior, and second only to Harclwicke. In the rank of supremacy in the long line of chancery judges he modestly placed himself third.1 1 Jessel's work may be studied in the following list of representative opinions: Re Hallett's Estate. 1 3 Cli. D. 693; Smith v. Chadwick, 46 L. T. 702, 20 Ch. I). 67; Wallis v. Smith, 21 Ch. D. 243; Re Campdens Charities, 18 Ch. Г). 310; Baker v. Sebright, 13 Ch. D. 179; Rossiter v. Miller, 36 L. T. 304; Adams v. Angelí, 5 Ch. D. 634: Anglo-Italian Bank v. Davies, 9 Ch. D. 275; Carter v. Wake, 4 Ch. D. 605; Dymond v. Croft, 3 Ch. D. 512; Re Eager, 32 Ch. D. 86; Flower v. I.loyd, 6 Ch. D. 297; Freeman v. Cox, 8 Ch.D. 148; Re Hargreave's Contract, 32 Ch. D. 454; Henty». Wrey, 21 Ch. D. 332; Palman v. Harland, 17 Ch. D. 353; Redgrave v. Hurd, 20 Ch. D. i; Richards v. Delbridge, L. R., 18 Eq. ii; Steed v. Preece, L. R. 18 Eq. 192: Sutton v. Sutton, 22 Ch. D. 511; Tussaud r. Tussaud, 9 Ch. P. 363; Walsh v. Lonsdale, 21 Ch. D. 9; Couldery v. Bartrum, 19 Ch. D. 394;
Bramwell had few of those subtle and impressives attributes which go toward the make-up 'of a great judge of appeal. It would be idle to compare him as such with such contemporaries as Cairns, Selbornc or Bowen. But his sturdy common sense was an invaluable influence for good among associates differently constituted. With his strong character, not wanting in sharp edges, he cut his name deeply in the law, while finer and less robust natures have left few traces. In the Court of Appeal, sitting with Brett and Mellish, he supplemented the impetuosity of the former and the somewhat academic narrowness of the latter. Sitting in equity with Jessel and James he was not so much in his element. On one occasion in following the chancery judges in giving opinion in an equity case, he said: "Having listened all day to things which I don't think I ever heard of before, I can safely say I am of the same opinion and for the same reasons." His pronounced views upon the desirability of holding people to their bargains prompted little sympathy with certain equitable doctrines. Cotton, through a longer term of service, made a very respectable reputation. He brought to the discharge of his judicial duties the clearness of thought and thorough preparation which characterized his vast labors as an equity lawyer, and, notwith standing a certain want of facility in expres sion, his numerous opinions (for he was rarely satisfied with mere acquiescence') will repay careful study.1 Upon the death of Jessel in 1883 he became more prominent as the presiding judge of the chancery division of the court. Sugden n. St. Leonards, I P. D. 154; Ex parte Rey nolds, 20 Ch. D. 294; Suffell-'. Bk. of England, 9 Q. Й. D. 555; Mersey Steel Co. v. Naylor, 9 Q. B. P. 648; Aynsley?'. f ¡lover, iSEq. 544; Speight v. Gaunt, 22 Ch. D. 727; Ewing v. Orr E wing, 22 Ch. D.; Re W. Canada Oil Co. 17 Eq. I (first case); Ex farte Willey, 74 L. T. 366 (last case). 1 Johnstone v. Milling, 16 Q. B. P. 460; Henty v. Capital & Counties Bank, 7 do. 174; Davies v. Davies, 36 Ch. D., 359; Allcard v. Skinner, 36 do. 145; Tod Heatley v. Benham, 40 do. 97; Angus v. Dalton, 6 App. Cas. 779; Harney v. Farnie, 6 P. D. 35; Niboyet r. Niboyet, 4 do. i; Re Goodman's Trusts, 44 L. T. 527; Turton v. Turton. 61 do. 571; Kensit v. Great Eastern Ry., 51 do. 863; Hunt v. Clarke, 61 do. 343.
