NEW LAW BOOKS. AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ESTOP PEL HV MISREPRESENTATION. "By John S. Ewart. Callaghan & Co., Chicago. 1900. Law sheep. $5.00. (xlviii. + 548 pp.) This is not a. collection of headnotes from the reports, nor a reprint of judicial opinions, nor a paraphrase of preceding text-books; but it is obviously the author's own systematic state ment of the law and of the principles under lying it. The preface does not give an adequate im pression of the attractiveness of the book; and it may even turn away some readers by creating the fear that the author adopts a new and grotesque nomenclature. For there can be no doubt that lawyers find little pleasure in re formed terrrinology, preferring familiar words, no matter how ambiguous they may be; and a justification of this apparent slovenliness is that the members of our intensely practical profession recognize the impossibility of displacing the ex pressions found in those old treatises and opin ions which must always be accepted as classic. At any rate, justification or no justification, there is nothing more certain than that lawyers would rebel against " falsâvert " and " pithallactos " — words seemingly approved in Mr. Ewart's pref ace. Those odd words may do excellent ser vice somewhere, and so may the clergymen who suggested them to Mr. Ewart; but such termin ology is out of place in law books. Fortu nately, the author, after discomposing the reader by his preface, fails to use those extraordinary words in his treatise. The new terms actually adopted are simply "estoppel-denier," for the person estopped and " estoppel-asserter,"for the person profiting by the estoppel; and these two innovations — at least when viewed in juxtaposi tion with the distorted fancies, " falsâvert " and "pithallactos " — seem inoffensive. After turning from the rather unpromising preface the reader finds that every page is lawyerlike. The charm of the book lies in the author's clearness and enthusiasm. His clearness de serves unqualified praise; but his enthusiasm ap pears not to be in all respects a blessing, for, although it has caused the author to do his work with vigor and originality, it has carried him into regions where most readers cannot follow him without doubts and fears. The trea
tise is composed of two nearly equal parts. In the earlier half the author deals with the general principles of estoppel. Here he is at home, and his views, though expressed in a novel way, excite little opposition. In the other half the author passes outside the home jurisdiction and undertakes to prove that estoppel is the doctrine underlying great bodies of law. hereto fore regarded as having doctrines of their own. In this half he is not so convincing. Two ex amples must suffice; negotiable instruments and agency. In dealing with negotiable instruments, in chapter xxiv, the author contends that the law merchant is a native of England and is harmo nious with the general doctrines of English law, and more specifically, that the incidents usu ally supposed to be attached to bills and notes by reason of peculiarities of the law merchant are really mere results of estoppel. Yet the author 's enthusiasm and imagination cannot long make the reader forget the facts of legal history. A glance at any treatise upon the system of commercial law prevailing upon the continent of Europe will indicate clearly enough that England did not create the law merchant, and an examination of Mr. Ewart's own book will demonstrate that the phenomena of nego tiability are older than estoppel. Again, in the dealing with agency, in chapter xxvi, the author finds in estoppel the explana tion of a principal's responsibility for an agent's unauthorized contracts within apparent author ity. Now, if estoppel is the explanation, a good contract with the principal is obtained by the third person — or "estoppel-asserter " — who actually knows the way in which the business in question is generally transacted, and no con tract with the principal is obtained by the third person who knows nothing of this course of business, — yet every lawyer knows that such knowledge or ignorance of the third person is not a matter of importance. Mr. Ewart sees this difficulty; and he tries to take care of it by a general proposition " that " in cases in which the law assumes (from the nature of the duty to be performed, from the relation of the parties, or from aught else) the existence of certain powers, the public will be justified in making a similar assumption." Doubtless estoppel does protect any member of the public who acts with
