Chapters from the Biblical Law. really the tribal or national house, was in the eye of the law, invested with certain rights which it was the duty of the entire tribe or nation to protect. Hence, merely crossing the threshold of sacred places, and especial ly standing by the side of the sacred altar or laying hold of the horns of the altar was suf ficient to insure immunity, even though there were no physical barriers to prevent the seizure and punishment of the suppliant at the sanctuary. But the peace of the com munity was threatened by the privileges thus claimed and allowed, inasmuch as any man might commit a murder, safe in the assurance that he would be protected merely by taking refuge in some sacred place. Hence, we find .in the oldest collection of1 laws in the Bible this proviso: "He that smiteth a man so that he die, shall be surely put to death; and if a man lie not in wait, but God deliver him unto his hand, then he will appoint a place whither he shall flee; but if a man come presumptuously upon his neighbor to slay;him with guile, thou shall take him from mine altar that he may die (Exodus xxi, 12-14). Thus the willful mur derer was deprived of the benefit of sanc tuary; and thereafter, it was limited to pro tect the man-slayer from the hand of the avenging kinsman only if the murder was not committed "presumptuously or by lying in wait." In other words, no immunity was granted to him who had been guilty of "mur der in the first degree." The Cities of Refuge which I described in the August, 1900, number of THE GREKN BAG were simply an extension of the right of sanctuary from a specific sacred place to an entire city. The sacred character of these cities is indicated by the fact that they were Levitical cities. The notion of the inviola bility of the refugee, as soon as he crossed the boundary of the city and entered its gate, is a survival of the old notion of the sacredness of the threshold and the duties of guest-friendship to the stranger who passed through it. The reasons for Solomon's action in the
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cases of Adonijah, Abiathar and Joab can readily be distinguished. The only legal justification for his refusal to recognize the right of sanctuary' is given in Joab's case; to wit, the charge that Joab had been guilty of willful murder, and therefore had deprived himself of the right of sanctuary. In Adoni jah's case Solomon could set up no such reason, and hence did not feel justified in taking Adonijah's life, and was obliged to m'ake him a promise of immunity. This promise is couched in such terms that it enabled the king shortly thereafter to take advantage of Adonijah's diplomatic folly and put him to death. In Abiathar's case, the sacredness of the office of high priest amply protected Abiathar from the king's vengeance, and Solomon was obliged to con tent himself with the deposition of Abiathar from his high office, and his exile to his patrimonial estate. The juridical or legal character of the sanctuary is attested by many Biblical cita tions. The ark of testimony containing the tables of the law was kept in the sanctuary (Exodus xxxix, 35), and was placed in charge of the priests (Deuteronomy xxxi, 9). It was to the altar that men went for the purpose of having an oath administered to them (2 Chronicles vi, 22). So closely con nected were the notions of sanctuary and administration of justice that the judges were known as Elohim, which is the Hebrew for God; and a case, therefore, was said to go before Elohim—that is to say, before the judges who represented God and who spoke judgment in his name. At Common Law in England, the privi lege of sanctuary survived until it was abolished by the statute, 2ist James I, chapter twenty-eight, paragraph seven. It may be that the privilege from civil arrest enjoyed in our own times by parties, wit nesses, attorneys, judges, jurors, and officers of the court, while attending court, and while going to and returning from court, is a sur vival of the right of sanctuary, though the reason for it now given is a different one.
