seem to have required more courage in him 4than judgment in his friends, to invite the danger of being made an object-lesson on other points by some of his own subordinates. He had taken his part in a victory, and a large part of the people had made up their minds at the moment, as they usually do, and had greeted the names and the persons of every one concerned in the fight with pa triotic enthusiasm and personal admiration. No technical question of command troubled the admirers of any officer. Nor was the popular fund of glory less for any other, be cause poured out so generously for this one. Each officer was praised for what was thought praiseworthy in what he did. There has never been any want of popular glory for any man in or near that fight. Whether a sailor's cap bears the word " New York," "Brooklyn," "Oregon," or "Reso lute," it brings him honor. The burning questions have been those of official and professional rewards. These have to be fought out in naval and political discussions, which it is not the purpose here to enter. These preliminary remarks are intended to approximate a proper perspective within which to look at the court of inquiry as a formal incident among many unregu lated results of the tumult of war. Strictly speaking, the court of inquiry was asked for, was granted, was conducted, was concluded and approved, with reference solely to the conduct of Commodore Schley. It is true that his counsel, in the preliminary examination as to whether Rear-Admiral Howison was qualified to serve as a member of the court, referred to that officer's opinions concerning the position of Admiral Samp son in the fight; but neither in the course of the inquiry did the Court admit, nor in the final arguments did any counsel attempt, the suggestion that Admiral Sampson was a party to the investigation.
Military law leaves so much to the discre tion, even, of its courts, and those courts, being appointed for special occasions, dif fer so much in personal and other circum stances, that in order to understand the opinion of a military court it is necessary to remember that the first principle in mili tary law is obedience to superiors and not individual liberty. The Judge Advocate stands in confidential relations to the court as adviser, but the members of the court are not bound to follow his advice. Whatever the precept orders the court to do, it must do, whether the rules or principles governing civil courts of common law and of equity have to be regarded or disregarded in doing it. COURTS OF INQUIRY AS AIDS TO A GOVERNMENT. War is said to silence laws, but lawyers and warriors work tolerably well together, when the warriors listen to argument and the lawyers recognize military rules. The lawyers' ability to marshal facts, to distin guish points, and to bring out of witnesses what they know upon the points at issue, without all their beliefs and impressions and prejudices, aid the military desire for clear ness and despatch; the military habit of deci sion and command hastens the judgment which the legal spirit prays for yet dreads. The Code Napoleon is a striking instance of such successful collaboration.1 The great sol dier who lent his name to that enduringsystem read the books which his lawyers advised, sat with them at their work, joined in their discussions, submitted to instruction; but, being thus informed, kept control, and when undue argument threatened despatch, he stopped them, decided the point at issue, and ordered the next business to be taken up. "'The Consulate and Empire of Napoleon," by Thiers.
