to the interests of the United States. In the progress of the investigation, Mr. Kilbonrn, a real estate dealer of Washington, was called as a witness, was questioned in regard to his dealings with various persons, and was ordered to produce his books for intepection. He declined to conform to these demands of the committee, and was at length, by order of the House, committed for contempt. From this confinement he was finally released by a writ of habeas corpus, issued by the chief justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia; whereupon he brought a civil action for damages against the Sergeant-at-Arms and the members of the committee of the House. On a demurrer to the answer of the defendants, which set up (the order of the House as their defence, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia held the answer to be good. But on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States that decision was reversed. Justice Miller's opinion reviews the his tory of the subject as found in the various cases before the House of Commons of Great Britain, which were afterwards carried to the (English courts, and reaches the conclusion that, while in that country, by reason of the history of Parliament and of its original pos session of full judicial powers, the House of Commons could punish for contempt, there is no inherent authority in any purely legis lative body, apart from that remnant of judi cial power remaining in Parliament, to pun ish parties for offences of this character. Re ferring to the Constitution, under which alone Congress could exercise such power, he de clared that there is a total absence of such authority. But inasmuch as both branches of Congress had certain specific powers to make orders which required the examination of wit nesses, the House could in such cases punish contempt by fine and imprisonment. Such occasions were, however, limited to such cases as the punishment of its own members for disorderly conduct or failure to attend
sessions, or in cases of contested elections, or in regard to the qualifications of its own members, or in case of an effort to impeach an officer of the government, and perhaps a few others. But neither the Senate nor the House had any right to organize an investi gation into the private affairs of a citizen, and, except in a case in which the Constitu tion expressly conferred upon them powers which were in their nature somewhat judicial, and as such required the examination of wit nesses, they possessed no power to compel attendance and enforce answers to interrog atories which did not relate to some question of which it had jurisdiction. "If they are proceeding in a matter beyond their legitimate cognizance, we are of opinion that this can be shown, and we cannot give our assent to the principal that, by the mere act of asserting a person to be guilty of con tempt, they thereby establish their right to fine and imprison him beyond the power of any court or any other tribunal whatever to inquire into the grounds on which the order was made. This necessarily grows out of the nature of an authority which can only exist in a limited class of cases, or under spe cial circumstances; otherwise the limitation is unavailing and the power omnipotent." Referring to the independence of the dif ferent branches of the government, and the necessity that each should keep within its appropriate powers, he concluded with these wise reflections upon legislative powers : "While the experience of almost a century has in general shown a wise and commend able forbearance in each of these branches [legislative, executive and judicial] from en croachments upon the others, it is not to be denied that such attempts have been made, and it is believed not always without success. The increase in the number of States, in their population and wealth, and in the amount of power, if not in its nature, to be exercised by the Federal government, presents powerful (and growing temptation's to those to whom
