A Century of Federal Judicature. of exclusive privileges tends rather to ob struct than to stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing- wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country without contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts. It em barrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to lawsuits and vexa tious accountings for profits made in good faith." Within the limits thus defined he believed in the liberal administration of the patent laws. In his great opinion in the fat acid case (Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 77) he demonstrated that the true spirit and intent of the patent law was to secure to the in ventor of a new application of a principle to effect a useful purpose, a monopoly of the application of the principle, instead of lim iting him to the special means set forth in his application. By a series of well-known decisions on the law of re-issues he revolu tionized the former practice, and removed a stigma from the patent system. Railway Company v. Sayles, 97 U. S. 554; Powder Company v. Powder Works, 98 ib. 126; Miller v. Brass Company, 104 ib. 350; James v. Campbell, 104 ib. 356; Mahu v. Harwood, 117 ib. 354. In these cases he demonstrated that the true construction of the patent law authorized no alteration in the specification of an existing patent, unless made promptly and for the purpose of correcting a bona fide mistake inadvertently committed, such as a court of chancery, in cases within its juris diction, would correct. This ended the practice of re-issuing patents in the hands of speculators to cover inventions made by sub sequent inventors and not contemplated by the original patentee. In the great contest over the telephone patent (126 U. S. i) he dissented from the
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inajority, in a characteristic; opinion, on the ground that Daniel Drawbaugh had antici pated Bell's invention. Drawbaugh cer tainly had the principle, he contended, and accomplished the result. "We do not ques tion Mr. Bell's merits. He appreciated the importance of the invention, and brought it before the public in such a manner as to at tract to it the attention of the scientific world. His professional experience and at tainments enabled him to see, at a glance, that it was one of the greatest discoveries of the century. Drawbaugh was a different sort of man. He did not see it in this halo of light. ... He was only a plain mechanic; somewhat better instructed than most ordi nary mechanics; a man of more reading, of better intelligence. But he looked upon what he had made more as a curiosity than as a matter of financial, scientific, or public importance. ... It is perfectly natural for the world to take the part of the man who has already achieved eminence. No pa triotic Briton could believe that anybody but Watt could produce an improvement in the steam engine. . . . We do not wish to say a word depreciatory of Mr. Bell. He was original, if not first. He preconceived the principle on which the result must be ob tained, by that forecast which is acquired from scientific knowledge, as Leverrier did the place of the unknown planet; but in this, as in the actual production of the thing, he was, according to the great preponderance of the evidence, anticipated by a man of far humbler pretensions. A common astrono mer, by carefully sweeping the sky, might have been first in discovering the planet Neptune; whilst no one; but a Leverrier, or an Adams, could have ascertained its exist ence and position by calculation." In the important branch of maritime law, also, Justice Bradley is a widely recognized authority. With respect to marine insurance (Insurance Company v. Dunham, n Wall, i), to collisions (The Bclgcnland v. Jensen, 114
