based on nothing better than the statement that gold is a prime necessity in war. It cer tainly is; and nearly all agree that a belliger ent may lawfully confiscate any supplies of it he may find in a neutral vessel on its way to the enemy. Money is contraband of war, and must be treated like other articles in the same category. The neutral lender in it lends at his own risk, but he commits no breach of the common law of nations by lending, and his government is under no obligation to attempt the impossible task of preventing him. * But it is claimed that gifts or voluntary subscriptions stand upon a different footing from ordinary loans. In 1823 the law officers of the British Crown, in response to an in quiry from the British Cabinet in respect to the legality of certain funds which were being raised in behalf of the Greek revo lutionists whose belligerency had been recognized by the British Government, gave an opinion to the effect that "voluntary sub scriptions of the nature alluded to were in consistent with neutrality and contrary to the law of nations." z In commenting upon this opinion, Lawrence says, "Even in de ciding, and rightly deciding that voluntary gifts and subscriptions were illegal, the Brit ish law officers took care to add that the bel ligerent against whom they were directed would not have the right to consider them as constituting an act of hostility on the part of the neutral government. Moreover, they abstained from recommending a prosecution of the subscribers on the ground that it would be almost certain to fail.1' 3 But of what use, we may ask, is a prohibi1 Lawrence. of>. cil., pp. 522-23. Ci. Hall. p. 598.
- Lawrence, p. 52.1.
For the documents, see Halleck (Baker's éd.) IL, pp. 195-97. But with respect to loans, the learned lawyers declared that "if entered into merely with commercial views, we think, according to the opinion of writers on the law of nations and the practice which has prevailed, they would not be an infringement of neutrality." ' Lawrence, pp. 323-24.
tion in International Law which can not be made effective, or a rule for the non-enforce ment of which a neutral State cannot be held responsible. The only apparently sound argument in favor of such a rule which oc curs to us is one which is based upon the doctrine of intent. It might be urged that we ought to distinguish, as in the case of the sale, construction, or exportation of a war-ship, between a bona fide commercial transaction and an intent to render assist ance to one of the belligerents. But the rules of International Law have fortunately not been devised to satisfy the demands of logic or of any system of classification, and the doctrine of intent, at least as applied to ships of war,4 is one of very doubtful value and validity. For, as an able writer has well said, "in international wrongs . . . the intent is not the thing chiefly or primari ly regarded."0 So far as can be ascertained, the people and Government of the United States have fully discharged their neutral obligations toward both belligerents in this war up to the present time.0 President Roosevelt's Proclamation of Neutrality, issued on Feb ruary loth, was more than usually full and explicit and it takes advanced ground on all important questions. In accordance with the terms of our Neutrality Law, the acceptance of commissions and enlistment in the military or naval service of either bel ligerent are strictly forbidden.7 In ac cordance with the requirements of Interna tional Law as well as of our Neutrality Act, 4 In respect to the construction, sale and exportation of ships of war, International Law would probably gain in efficiency as well as clear ness if these acts were altogether forbidden. It is highly probable that this is now the rule. But this is a point which will be more fully discussed in a subsequent paper. 5 Bernard. The Neutrality of Great Britain, of. cit., p. 398. ' June 25, 1904. 1 As has been noted above, these would not, strictly speaking, be offences in the eyes of International Law.
