NOTES OF RECENT CASES Re Hall & Stilson, 33 Fed. 527. Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450. Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256. Metcalf v. Barker, 177 U. S. 165. Pick ens v. Roy, 177 U. S. 177. Weeks v. Fowler, 71 N. H. 321. Covel v. Hey m an, in U. S. 176. Heidritter v. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S. 294. But an attachment on real estate gives to the court which issues it neither actual nor con structive possession of the property, but only creates a lien in favor of the attaching creditor on the estate. Therefore, possession of the attached land may be acquired by any other tribunal in sub sequent proceedings, and when so acquired will be exclusive to the extent that such tribunal may order the estate sold free and clear of all attach ment liens, transferring such liens to the proceeds of the sale. In re Christy, 3 How. 292. Southern Loan & Trust Co. v. Bendow, 96 Fed.
514 at 527. In re Waterloo Organ Co., 118 Fed. 904. In re Union Trust Company, petitioner, 122 Fed. 937. In re Shoe & Leather Reporter, 12 A. B. R. 248 C. C. A. Lee M. Friedman. LOTTERIES. (Element of Chance.) Mich. — A holding on the subject of lotteries, which will serve to make more clear a part of the question which has been shrouded in more or less uncer tainty, is contained in People v. McPhee, 103 Northwestern Reporter, 174. Defendant, who was a merchant tailor, organized as a part of his regular business, a suit club, consisting of thirty members, who each paid a dollar a week. The club met each Saturday night and conducted a drawing, by which the successful member obtained from defendant a suit or overcoat worth twenty dollars. The successful member coulc4 *-hen draw out and a. new member be taken in. iviembers were, however, entitled to withdraw at any time and receive from defendant clothing of the value of the money they had contributed to the club, or credit for clothing to be subsequently pur chased. This enterprise is held to be a lottery. This holding would seem to go somewhat beyond the ordinary definitions of lottery, such, for in stance, as that of Bishop, which states that "a lottery is any scheme whereby one, on paying money or other valuable thing, becomes entitled to receive from him such return in value, or nothing, as some formula of chance may deter mine." The court, however, points out that it
was not the intention of this, or of other definitions, to exclude cases in which there were no blanks. The case of Ballock v. Maryland, 20 Atlantic, 184, is cited, and its language expressly approved. It is there said, in effect, that the court is not justified in deciding a thing not to be a lottery simply because there can be no loss when there may be considerable contingent gain, or because it lacks some element of a lottery, according to some particular definition, when it has all the other elements, with all the pernicious tendencies which the State is seeking to prevent. A number of other cases dealing with the same subject are also cited, particularly, State v. Interstate Savings & Investment Co., 60 N. E. 220; Wooden v. Shotwell, 23 N. J. Law, 465; United States v. Olncy, Fed. Case No. 15,918; State v. Mumford, 73 Mo. 647; McDonald v. United States, 63 Fed. 426, and Equitable Loan & Security Co. v. Waring, 117 Ga. 599, 44 S. W. 320. PRACTICE. (Costs — Suing in Forma Pauperis.) N. C. — In Christian v. Atlantic & North Carolina Railroad Co., 48 Southwestern Reporter, 743, the Supreme Court of North Carolina agrees that an administrator is entitled to sue as a pauper, al though there is some contrariety of opinion as to just what must be shown in order to entitle him to so sue. The main opinion by Clark, C. J., holds that an administrator is within section 210 of the Code, allowing any person to sue in forma pauperis, on making affidavit that he is unable to give security, and that where the action is for the death of intestate, it is not necessary to show that those who may share in the recovery cannot give security. The latter portion of this holding pro ceeds upon the theory that the recovery will not be assets of the estate, and that the plaintiff sues in his own right and is individually liable for costs. In view of this fact, it is concluded that it is not necessary to show that those to whom the re covery would be distributed are unable to give bond, but merely that the administrator is per sonally unable to do so. Douglas, J., concurring in the result, is of the opinion that it is not neces sary for the administrator to be personally a pauper in order to sue as such, and construes the statute to mean that an administrator is entitled to sue as a pauper if he is unable to give a bond as administrator. Walker, J., with whom Mont gomery, J. concurs, is of the opinion that an administrator, while entitled to sue as a pauper, must show that he is unable to comply with the requirement as to giving bond for costs, and must further make it appear that those for whose bene fit the suit is really brought are also unable to comply with the statute.
