EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT Supreme Court on the constitutional guarantee of due process. It hence confines itself primarily to the decisions of that court, and hence also an effort has been made by the author to include all of its decisions up to the end of volume 199 of the United States Reports. The work opens with a brief but most excellent historical introduction, and the body of the book is based on a classification that cannot be too highly recommended. The principles of due process, as applied to notice and hearing, are discussed early in its pages, and taxation, eminent domain, and the police power are dealt with in the order named, and not in a reversed order as is occasionally done. In all these points, and all of them are improvements on the author's own previous classification as it appeared in the American and English Encyclopaedia of Law, the arrange ment of the subject leaves little, if anything, to be desired. To the thoughtful and atten tive student a good classification constitutes more than half the value of a law book, while the busy lawyer that cannot study, but only consult the pages of a volume, looks for an index that affords an easy and prompt refer ence to sub-topics and details. Here we have both. Xo student of constitutional questions, no lawyer with an occasional or permanent practice in the federal courts should neglect to add the book to his library. When carrying out the plan of his work, the author has wisely, though probably more than he had originally intended, gone into the wide field of state decisions on due process, and cited many of the leading cases, especially in New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Mis souri, much to the elucidation of the subjects discussed. For readers of the book here reviewed, as well as for the purpose of a second edition by the author, we would sug gest the following additional federal cases of importance: Under State Laws impairing the Obligation of Contracts, Railway Company v. Rock, 4 Wall. 177; Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, i Wall. 175; Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527; Louisiana v, Jumel, 107 U.S. 711; The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51; Fertilizing Company v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659; Illinois Central R. R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387; under Taxation, Loan Asso ciation v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; License Tax
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Cases, 5 Wall. 462; Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171; State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204; Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Thomp son v. Pacific R. R., 9 Wall. 579; Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5; Western Union Tele graph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U.S. 530; California v. Central Pacific R. R., 127 U. S. i; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305; under the Police Power, in re Rapier, 143 U.S. no; United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41, and Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465. Under ex post facto and retro-active laws, as well as under eminent domain, it seems that not a single leading case has been overlooked by the author. — WILLIAM E. WALZ. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Eminent Domain and the Police Power). Recent American evolution has shown a great growth in the aesthetic sense of the people. Vast domains and large sums have been appropriated for purely pleasure and artistic purposes. The legal decisions which mirror this recent advance and define the public's powers are examined by Wilbur Larremore in the Novem ber Harvard Law Review (V. xx, p. 35) in an article entitled " Public Esthetics." The authority of a state or municipality to appropriate or acquire land for public parks or recreation grounds under eminent domain is well settled. " A public park once estab lished is to be held sacred to the ends of recreation and aesthetic gratification. The legal crux arises as to the control of private property in the interest of the general sense of beauty. ... It is believed that both on theoretical and practical grounds the law must be taken as settled that, although public aesthetic ends may be effectuated through the exercise of eminent domain, the same object may not be accomplished by legislation under the police power without compensation. "It does not, however, follow that the analogy of offensive advertisements to offen sive sounds and odors will always remain utterly futile. It is submitted that judicial power might be exercised under the facts of a given case to restrain a particular adver tisement, or collection of advertisements, as a nuisance. An inherently lawful business may
