INTERSTATE EXTRADITION obtain custody of fugitives from justice), and the duty to deliver them in any part of the United States, derive their whole validity and obligation exclusively from the Constitution of the United States; second, because the nature of the subjects requires that they should be controlled by one and the same will, and act, uniformly by the same system of regulations, throughout the Union. Taney, Chief Justice, Thompson, Baldwin, and Daniel, Justices, dissent from Story's views as to the exclusive power of Congress. The first reason assigned by him does not seem valid. It is admitted that a state cannot force other states of its own power to deliver up fugitives from justice; this power resides exclusively in the na tional government. But this fact of itself constitutes no reason in logic or necessity why the states should not be allowed to act voluntarily on ground of comity so long as they do not conflict with the express right and duty prescribed by the Constitution. With reference to the second reason assigned by Story, Mr. Justice Thompson remarks that the mere fact that congressional legis lation might be the more appropriate remedy does not render state legislation unconsti tutional; to have that effect the case must be so strong that state action is absolutely inappropriate. The strength of this second reason, as applied to the particular kind of legislation treated in this article, will be further considered a little later. Taney, Chief Justice, uses the following language: "Moreover the clause of the Constitution of which we are speaking does not purport to be a distribution of the rights of sov ereignty, by which certain enumerated powers of government and legislation are exclusively confided to the United States. It does not deal with that subject. It pro vides merely for the rights of individual citizens of different states, and places them under the protection of the general govern ment, in order more effectually to guard them from invasion by the states. There are other clauses in the Constitution by
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which other individual rights are provided for and secured in like manner; and it has never been suggested that the states could not uphold and maintain them, because they were guarantied by the Constitution of the United States." These remarks may be applied with equal force to the provision of the Constitution concerning interstate rendition of fugitives from justice; the only difference being that this provision confers certain rights upon states instead of indi viduals. In United States v. McClay, 26 Fed. Cas. 1051; In re Robb, 19 Feb. 26; Ex parte McKean, 16 Feb. Cas. 186; and Degant v. Michael, 2 Ind. 396, there are expressions, arguendo, or by way of dictum to the effect that the power of legislation over interstate rendition of fugitives from justice is exclu sive in Congress, the court in each case relying upon the dictum of Mr. Justice Story. On the other hand many states have passed statutes auxiliary to the fed eral statute, providing for the manner of arrest and detention of fugitives and other matters of detail. These statutes have been held constitutional by the courts of last resort in those states, contrary to the views of that judge. For cases on this point see Com. v. Tracy, 5 Mete. 536; Ex parte Rosenblatt, 51 Cal. 285; Kurtz v. State, 22 Fla. 41, 1 Am. St. Rep. 175. In Moore v. People of the state of Illinois, 14 How. 13, 14 L. Ed. 306, the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Grier, states that the court merely held in Prigg v. Com., that any state law which interrupts or impedes the right of the owner to the immediate pos session of his slave is void, and makes no mention of the views expressed in that case by way of dictum. It seems not unlikely that those views would not re ceive the sanction of the courts in our day, in the light of this tendency to ignore them. So far we have assumed for the sake of argument that the provisions of the Consti tution and of the state legislation under discussion cover the same ground and
