NOTES OF RECENT CASES companies to restrain defendants from dealing in tickets issued for passage to and from the James town Exposition. Defendants set up as a defense that the non-transferable clause was invalid be cause not referred to in the published schedule and statement relative to rates. The court held the defense good and as against the contention of com plainants that defendants being purchasers with knowledge of the limitations, were not in position to avail themselves of any illegality in the tickets, said that " defendants are not seeking any relief at the hands of the court and the complainants cannot escape the consequences of weakness in their own case by relying on any disability that may or may not attach to the defendants." CARRIERS. (False Representation of Shipper.) H. Y. Sup. Ct. — In Hanna v. Pitt & Scott. 106 N. Y. Supp. 145, the court passes on a question of the liability of a shipper of goods for which it was un able to find any precedent. The complaint alleged that defendant had delivered to complainant's assignor for shipment, a piece of machinery which together with the packing weighed more than nine teen thousand pounds, under representation that the entire weight would not exceed nine thousand pounds; that owing to defendant's misrepresenta tion as to weight, plaintiff's assignor, a steamship company, attempted the unloading with ma chinery inadequate to stand the strain of such an enormous weight and in consequence thereof, broke and injured a stevedore to whom the steam ship company was obliged to pay damages. The present action was instituted against the shipper for the recovery of the sum paid. The court referred to some cases in which the principle is announced that a shipper is bound to notify the carrier of any inherent dangerous quali ties in goods shipped, but said that in this instance, the bulk and weight of the shipment was as open and obvious and as easy to determine by the carrier as by the shipper and denied recovery. CARRIERS. (Validity of Rate Laws.) U. S. C. C. — Beginning with the litigation leading up to the decision by Judge McPherson in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Missouri in St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hadley, 155 Fed. Rep. 220, a series of attacks has been made in the Federal Courts on the railroad rate legislation of Missouri, Iowa, North Carolina, Alabama and Minnesota. In the case referred to above, an injunction was asked restraining enforcement of the state law. Defendants contested the jurisdiction of the Fed eral Court, but their contention was not sustained. The court referred to the numerous and intricate questions involved, and refused an injunction, on the ground that the law should be enforced for a
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time in order to test whether the rates prescribed would yield a reasonable compensation. The validity of the Iowa law came before Judge McPherson also. His decision is reported in 155 Fed. Rep. 226, under the title Poor v. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co. In that case the bill was filed by stock holders against the railroad companies to restrain putting the rates into effect, and the court held that under the showing made it did not sufficiently appear that proper demand had been made upon the corporate officers prior to institution of the suit, as required by Equity Rule 94. The North Carolina law was the bone of conten tion in the habeas corpus proceeding before Judge Pritchard, in Ex Parte Wood, 155 Fed. Rep. 190. Petitioner was convicted in the state court of violating the rate law and sentenced to imprison ment. He then applied to the Federal Court for release. It appears from the opinion that some time prior thereto suits had been instituted in the Federal Court to restrain the enforcement of the rates prescribed, on the ground that they were confiscatory. A restraining order had been issued and was still in force when petitioner was con victed. Judge Pritchard discharges the peti tioner, vigorously defends the jurisdiction of his court, and states his intention to use all power at hand to see that its mandates are obeyed. The law provides a penalty of $500 for each violation and for imprisonment of agents and employees found guilty. Passing to consideration of the merits, it was held that one section was invalid as a denial of equal protection of laws by imposition of such extreme penalties as to practically close the courts against plaintiff in case it desired to contest the validity of the statute. A short time after the above decision was ren dered, the injunction suit referred to came up on the question of continuing until final hearing the restraining order issued at the time of instituting the proceeding, and the question of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court was again discussed, it being contended that the suit was in reality one against the state rather than against state officers charged with enforcement of the law. The opinion of Judge Pritchard. on this and other questions, is found in Southern Ry. Co. v. McXeill, 155 Fed. Rep. 756. Numerous authorities are cited and the conclusion reached that the suit is against the state officers, and not within the constitutional prohibition forbidding suits against states. The injunction was ordered continued until final hear ing, protection to the public being provided by requiring bonds of the railroad company to satisfy any recovery had against it by reason of enforce ment of the former higher rates in case the new law should be held valid.
