6
The Green Bag
The Court itself sometimes recog nizes the fact that it is paying greater heed to common sense than to the teach ings of legal science. In the earlier days of the country, "every case was decided on its own circumstances by the exercise of common sense." But as the community "advances in wealth and re finement, relative rights become more complicated and difficult. Doubtful questions arise daily, which cannot be easily decided by the exercise of com mon sense without fringement upon the constitutional rights of one of the parties to the suit." Hence those "who know nothing of the spirit and reason of law, and who must consequently be ignorant of the natural foundation of justice," must learn "always to respectfully bow to the decisions of courts of justice, reserving always their constitutional rights."* In other words, when a court of law tries to decide difficult questions as common sense dictates, some one's con stitutional rights are apt to be invaded; hence the Court ought rather to employ its legal learning, but constitutional rights are also likely to be invaded then. Perhaps the Court sometimes wavered in trying to make up its mind whether the common sense or the learned method offered the better way of unraveling knotty problems. In one case, in 1867, it delivered itself of the following opinion: "It is to be admitted, however, that courts often find diffi culty in freeing cases from those misty intricacies into which they are some times taken by the astute lawyer. He, by his sagacity and skill, throws them into a labyrinth of almost inextricable mystery, from which it is sometimes hard to relieve them. This, however, is our duty, and we must perform it."t 'Benson v. Roberts, p. 32. t Harris v. Republic, p. 39.
In these earlier years the Court seemed to be groping its way out of the darkness of confused principles into the daylight of legal knowledge. The later decisions convey an impression of greater confi dence and exactitude. In 1892 we come upon this eloquent and striking asser tion of the dignity of Liberian institu tions, which also throws light on the reason for giving the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in all cases :— We find in the idea of the Constitution that the right of appeal in civil and criminal cases is one of the fundamental prerogatives upon which the liberty of the people stands. To do away with this idea would be to set aside the dearest provision of the fathers, made in the bulwark of our national fabric, which serves as a preventive against oppression and a security to the enjoyment of civil liberty; without which, the people must become dwarfed in manhood and enterprise, and as a consequence energy, thrift, enterprise and noble aspirations will cease to exist and flourish under our national flag, and will seek some other land for encouragement and pro tection. The framers of the Constitution, knowing this, and considering our situation, disadvantages, and our limited knowledge of law and of political government at that time, sought to make our national road to great ness plain and easy, and to be understood by the whole people; hence, by the Constitution, they clothed the Supreme Court with appel late jurisdiction in all cases of appeal.* The formal adoption of the common law came about in the earlier period of the Republic's existence, by means of a statute which read:— Blackstone's Commentaries, as revised and modified by Chitty or Wendell, and the works referred to as the sources of muni cipal or common law in Kent's Commentaries on American Law, volume first, shall be the civil and criminal code of laws for the Repub lic of Liberia, except such parts as may be changed by the laws now in force, and such as may hereafter be enacted; and all laws and parts of laws conflicting with the provisions of this act be and the same is hereby repealed. •Page 526.
