A New Use for the Constructive Trust up — called a $100.00 bet under the impression that "Charlie" held a Bobtailed Flush, and when instead he showed up a full hand, he regretted, temporarily,
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until he played even on the Senator later in the game, that he did not rule on the admissibility of the "Leading Question" on oral argument.
Denver, Colorado.
A New Use for the Constructive Trust By Alvah C. Hough
THE recent decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri that a widower who has murdered his wife cannot take the one-half of her property given him by statute, re-opens a question that every one was inclined to regard as settled; and throws the question out again as an "apple of discord" for the courts to scramble over. The question had been decided the other way by a clear majority, when the latest hold ing in Perry v. Strawbridge (Mo. 1908, 108 S. W. 641) showed that even the courts are not friendly to a strict statu tory construction that abets iniquity. The history of the controversy is brief. In 1889, the court of last resort in New York decided that a youth of sixteen, who, knowing that he was residuary legatee under his grandfather's will, in order to prevent a revocation, which he apprehended, and to hasten his enjoyment, killed his ancestor, could take neither as legatee nor heir. (Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506.) The year before, North Carolina had held oppo sitely in a case involving a widow's dower right. (Owens v. Owens, 100 Nor. Car. 240, 1888.) This decision the New York court declined to follow. The pendulum swung the other way in 1894, when Nebraska, in turn, declined to follow the New York holding, and
decided that the murderer took abso lutely. (Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 1894.) With these conflicting views confronting him, the unbiased lawyer might fairly be said to be "at a stand"; but in 1895, Pennsylvania in Carpenter's Estate (170 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637, 29 L. R. A. 145, 1895), in which they reviewed all the authori ties, added another chapter to the contorversy by holding with Shellenberger v. Ransom and against Riggs v. Palmer. Since then the pendulum has swung back and forth in Deem v. Milliken (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 357, affirmed in 53 Ohio St. 668, 1895), Ohio; Box v. Lanier (112 Tenn. 93, 1903), Tennessee; Kuhn v. Kuhn (125 Iowa 449, 1904), Iowa; and, finally, in Perry v. Strawbridge, Missouri, 1908. It is not surprising to find, also, strong, dissenting opinions on both sides. Only in a later New York case, is any middle ground suggested. (Elkrson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N.E. 540, 1896). It is there intimated that equitable relief might be had though it does not specifically mention the con structive trust. While the typical case is that of an heir who murders his ancestor, thus involving the statute of descent, other cases are referred to that present varia
