Right
of Labor
Union
to
Compel Members to Aid
in Strike by Imposing or Threatening to Impose Penalties* By W. A. Martin, New Orleans, La.
WHETHER or not a labor union may, in aid of a strike which it has declared, employ, in respect of mem bers unwilling to quit their employment, such coercion as is incidental to the imposition of, or threats to impose, pen alties, such as fines, suspension or expul sion, in order to compel them to join the strike, or to continue on strike after going out, is a question of paramount importance to the union and likewise of considerable importance to the employer against whom the strike is declared. This question comes up for consideration in connection with three distinct and welldefined states of facts. 1st, Where the strike is unlawful. 2d, Where the strike is lawful, but the members against whom the coercive measures are directed are under contract to work for a definite time, Jd, Where the strike is lawful and the members against whom such measures are directed are not under contract to work for a definite time, but may quit their employment at will. 1st. The question is one of easy solu tion, where the strike itself is unlawful— i. e., where the strike is in breach of contract by those engaged in the strike, to serve for a definite time, or where the end sought to be gained thereby is one which the law does not regard as legit imate or proper. In such case any act in furtherance of the strike will be deemed unlawful, however innocent it ♦Copyright, 1909, by W. A. Martin.
might be if done to attain a legitimate end.1 In consequence, threats to im pose, or the imposition of penalties such as fines, suspension, or expulsion for the purpose of keeping in line members un willing to join or continue in an un lawful strike is unlawful.2 This prin ciple has found direct application in the case of strikes in aid of boycotts.3 Where the threat of fine and expulsion is employed for the purpose of coercing the employees of a large number of different employers to refrain from working for them, in order to coerce all these employers into boycotting a third person with the ultimate object of coercing the latter in respect of a matter with which the employees coerced into striking have no concern whatever, the scheme becomes an attack upon his right to a free labor market.4 It has, accordingly, been held that officers and members of a union may be enjoined from attempting to coerce into striking lA. R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union, 232 1ll. 402, 83 N. E. 640; Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294, 84 N. E. 457; Hellenbrand v. Building Trades Council, 14 Ohio, Dec. 628.
- Purvis v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners, 214 Pa. St. 344, 60 Atl. 585, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 242. 112 Am. St. Rep. 272; Quinn v. Leathern (1901), A. C. 495, 70 L.J.P.C., 76. 85, L T. 289, 50 W. R. 139, 65 J. P. 708; Schneider v. Local Union No. 60, 116 La. 270, 40 Ga. 700, 5 L. R. A. (N.S.) 891, 114 Am. St. Rep. 549; Coons v. Chrystie, 53 N. Y. Suppl. 668. And see opinion of Sheldon, J., in L. D. Willcutt &* Sons Co. v. Bricklayers' Benevolent cSr* Pro tective Union, Mass., 85 N. E. 897; Wabash R. Co. v. Hannahan, 121 Fed. 563; In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 Fed. 828. 3Alfred W. Booth v. Burgess, N. J., 65 Atl. 226; Purvis v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 214 Pa.St. 344, 63 Atl. 585, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 242, 112 Am. St. 272. 'Alfred W. Booth v. Burgess, N. J., 65 Atl. 226.
