Labor Union's Right of Compulsion entitled to an injunction against such acts. This decision assumes to follow and is perhaps sustained by Martel v. White,10 another Massachusetts case, which held that although a combina tion of manufacturers formed for the purpose of competing more successfully with outsiders in the same business is not unlawful, yet the enforcement of a by-law prohibiting members from deal ing with those not members, by the imposition of fines so large as to be coercive in their nature, will give a right of action to a manufacturer not a member of the association, whose busi ness is injured thereby; Martel v. White is practically identical in its facts and in the conclusions reached with Boutwell v. Marr}1 a decision of the Supreme Court of Vermont, and gives unqualified approval to the reasoning of that Court. On the other hand there are a number of decisions involving labor disputes which are squarely in conflict with the Willcutt case, and others which at least inferentially sup port them. Thus in Jetton-Dehkle Lumber Co. v. Mather,12 a decision of the Florida Supreme Court, it was held that an employer of labor is not entitled to an injunction to prevent officers and members of a union, acting in furtherance of a lawful strike, from fining or expelling, or threatening to fine or expel members, in order to pre vent them from working for such em ployer; that courts will not interfere with labor unions in the peaceable enforce ment of their rules. In Longshore Print ing & Publishing Co. v. Howell,13 it was held that the ordering by officers of a union of its members to cease working ,0185 Mass. 255. 69 N. E. 185, 64 L. R. A. 260, 102 Am. St. Rep. 341. "71 Vt. 1. 42 Atl. 607, 76 Am. St. Rep. 746, 43 L. R. A. 803. "43 So. 590. "26 Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547. 46 Am. St. Rep. 640, 28 L. R. A. 464.
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for one against whom a justifiable strike had been declared, under penalty of being dealt with in accordance with the rules and by-laws of the union which provided for suspension or expulsion, was not in violation of a statute making it a misdemeanor for a person by threats, force or intimidation, to prevent an em ployee from continuing or performing his work, and that the employer was not en titled to an injunction against such acts. In Mayer v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association,1* it was held that an in junction will not be granted an asso ciation of employers, to prevent a union from enforcing one of its rules whereby members who work for an employer with whom the union has a trade dispute are denounced as "scabs" and expelled. In Gray v. Building Trades Council,15 it was held not un lawful for officers of a union to "order" their members to cease working on premises where complainant, with whom the union had a trade dispute, was en gaged in doing work as a contractor, and that an injunction awarded him should be modified in so far as it pro hibited such acts. This decision is scarcely distinguishable from the Flor ida case, and those similar to it herein cited. It is true that it does not appear from the opinion that the "order" was accompanied by threats of the imposition of a penalty, but the rules and by-laws of labor organizations invariably provide a penalty for dis obedience of the orders of its duly accredited officers, and the order itself necessarily imports that non-compliance therewith will subject the offender to a penalty. In Thomas v. Cincinnati R. Co.,16 a proceeding by a receiver to punish a labor union official for con"47 N. J. Eq. 519, 20 Atl. 492. "91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663, 103 Am. St. Rep. 477. 63 L. R. A. 753. "62 Fed. 803, 817.
