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The Green Bag
can be found which in the slightest degree limits it. This right has been announced by the courts with such frequency that any citation of authority therefor is mere waste of time, except, perhaps, in a few special instances where it might be and with some degree of plausibility has been argued that it is subject to limitations. The special instances to which allusion is made are those in which it was urged that the right is limited or non-existent, where the employer is a receiver, or where it was urged that the strike was prohibited by some general legislation, such as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the Interstate Commerce Act, or the statute making it an offense to retard the mails. It has been uniformly held, however, in the face of these contentions, that the right is in no way affected by the fact that the employer is a receiver, managing property under the control of the court,25 nor by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, although the cost of transporting inter state freight would be enhanced there by,26 nor by the Interstate Commerce Act, though the strike might incidentally result in interference with the inter change of interstate traffic with con necting fines,27 nor by section 3995 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (making it an offense to willfully retard the mails) even though the mails may be incidentally retarded by the strike.28 It is beyond controversy, therefore, that under any and all cir cumstances, the right of employees not bound by contract to serve for a definite "'Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310. 321, 11 C. C. A. 209, 25 L. R. A. 414; Thomas v. Cincinnati R. Co., 62 Fed. 803; United States v. Kane, 23 Fed. 748; In re Doolittle, 23 Fed. 544. And see Untied States v. Weber, 114 Fed. 950. "Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578. 593. "See Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730; Wabash R. Co. v. Hannahan. 121 Fed. 563; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310, 11 CCA. 209. 25 L. R. A. 414. K Untied States v. Debs, 65 Fed. 210. See also In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 Fed. 828.
term, to engage in a strike for better terms of employment, is superior to the right of the employer to a free labor market. Having ascertained what these pri mary rights are, and their relation to each other, the way is cleared for a con sideration of the principal question involved, i. e., whether, in aid of this superior and unqualified right to strike, the union and its members may, without infringing on the employer's qualified and inferior right to a free labor market, use the enginery of its rules and by laws and the accompanying penalties to force into joining the strike, or con tinuing on strike, such members as are unwilling to quit their employment, and cast in their lot with the common cause or, to borrow a phrase from the parlance of the betting ring, would rather "welch" than perform their obligations to their fellow members. Now, the general rule is well settled that a labor union or other voluntary association has the right to make rules and by-laws for the government of its members and the regulation of their conduct in respect of matters affecting the common welfare,29 and to punish its members, by fine, suspension or ex pulsion, according to the gravity of the offense, for disobedience of such rules and by-laws, or orders made in accord ance therewith by officers vested with the requisite authority,30 or for con"Jetton-Dehkle Lumber Co. v. Mather, Fla. 43 So. 490; Longshore Printing and Publishing Co. v. Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547, 46 Am. St. Rep. 640, 28 L. R. A. 464; Burns v. Bricklayers' Benevo lent and Protective Association, 14 N. Y. Suppl. 361, 27 Abb. N. C. 20 (affirming 10 N. Y Suppl. 916, 24 Abb. N. C. 150); Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. St. 79, 56 Atl. 327, 99 Am. St. Rep. 783; Brown Mfg. Co. v. Local Union No. 76, 12 Ohio, Dec. N. P. 753; Patterson v. Building Trades Council, 11 Pa. Dist. Rep. 500; Wabash, etc. R. Co. v. Hannahan, 121 Fed. 563. And see 4 CYC Associations, 305; Brennan v. United Hatters of North America, 73 N. J. L. 229, 65 Atl. 165, 9 L. R A. (N. S.) 254. xJetton-Dehkle Lumber Co. v. Mather, Fla., 43, So. 590, Burns v. Bricklayers' Benevolent and Protective Union, 14 N. Y. Suppl. 361, 27 N. C. 20 (affirming
