Latest Important Cases Cong. June 29, 1906, c. 3594, 34 Stat. 607, U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 918), author izing the shipper of cattle or the person accompanying them to extend the time of their confinement to thirty-six hours, was not such a delegation of legislative power as would render the law unconstitutional. For, said the Court (Gilbert, Circuit Judge),"While a Legislature may not delegate the power to legislate, it may delegate the power to deter mine some fact on which the operation of its own act is made to depend. Although the act in question herein incidentally protects the owners of live stock, its primary and important purpose is to prevent cruelty to animals in transportation. It needs no argu ment to show how great is the evil which it is intended to remedy. We find no ground for saying that the law as framed by Congress is not complete in itself. No part of it is made by the shipper, nor is he given the option to say that the carrier shall not comply with its provisions." The Court also held that the unit, in the case of violation of the act, was the indi vidual shipment of live stock and not the carload as contended by the plaintiff, finding controlling reason for so holding in the proviso of section 1 :— "That upon the written request of the owner or person in custody of that particular shipment, which written request shall be separate and apart from any printed bill of lading or other railroad form, the time of confinement may be extended to thirty-six hours." Legislative Power. Congress May Not Delegate Power to Create and Define Crimes— Unconstitutionality of Statute Making it Crimi nal to Violate Rules of Department of the Interior. U. S. A federal statute made it a criminal offense to violate rules which should thereafter be made by the Secretary of the Interior. The regulation in question prohibited the pasturing of stock within the forest reserves without a permit. In United States v. Grimaud, 170 Fed. Rep. 205, the defendant, having been arrested for pasturing sheep within a reserve, contended that the statute was void because it did not define the acts to be punished, and because it delegated legislative power to an executive officer. It did not declare the grazing of sheep to be a crime, nor make any reference thereto, but declared that whatever the execu tive prohibited should be punishable. There
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was no way by which a person examining a statute could conclude that the act referred to was criminal. The executive officer by the statute was allowed to define and deter mine crimes, which according to all the authorties is a legislative function. The United States District Court held that there could be nc crimes except those created, expressly de fined, and penalized by an act of Congress, and that the indictment could not be sus tained. Municipal Corporations. Ordinance to Regulate Rag- Picking Invalid— Ordinances in Restraint of Trade Passed for Protection from Fire Require Legislative Sanction. Mass. A city ordinance of Chelsea, Mass., passed after the great fire, forbade the use of any building for the picking, sorting or storage of rags without a written permit from the chief of the fire department. In Commonwealth v. Maletsky, the validity of this ordinance was called in question. The Supreme Judicial Court of the state, in a decision rendered Sept. 23, held the ordi nance void, saying:— "Neither expressly nor by necessary impli cation is the chief of the fire department re quired to base his action in granting or refusing a permit upon the danger of fire involved. . . . "This is not a case where the city govern ment has general control of the subject-matter of the ordinance and may impose such con ditions as it pleases. . . . The power of the city of Chelsea to deal with this subject is only what is given by Revised Laws, chap. 104, . '. ., and the city authorities can in no respect transcend the authority thus given. "We need not doubt the power of the Legis lature to establish such regulations as this or to delegate that power to city governments or other boards if it desired to do so, and to make licenses or permits from an adminis trative officer necessary to the exercise of trades or kinds of business that might involve a public danger. . . . But, as has been already pointed out, the effect of the enforce ment of this ordinance by the chief of the fire department may be wholly to prohibit the carrying on of the specified business in Chelsea. . . . The pursuit of a lawful busi ness, not of itself harmful, though it may be regulated, is not, without legislative sanction, wholly to be stopped by municipal ordinances for the prevention of fire or for safeguard against some other apprehended danger."
