The Dartmouth College Case the letter of the Constitution and within its spirit also, unless ..." 4 Wheaton, 643-644. With reference to "the second error" imputed to Marshall, you mistake the ques tion. It is a matter of New Hampshire inheriting obligations or liabilities, not powers. The state, on achieving its independence, acquired all the powers of sovereignty. But if we grant that New Hampshire inherited also certain obligations, the state certainly did not inherit the obligation of any contract which King George had not attempted to make by the Dartmouth College charter— which indeed he had no power to make. See opinion of Chief Justice Doe in 67 N. H. 27-53. You admit that later decisions have estab lished that there are certain classes of con tracts into which it is not "competent for the legislature to enter." But you claim that these later cases have not "materially modified" or refuted the doctrine of the college case. But if these contracts as to which the legislature is not "competent" are not distinguishable in principle from the contracts still held to be governed by the doctrine of the college case, you must admit that the doctrine has been both modified and refuted. Contracts exempting property from taxation are held to be governed by the rule of the college case; contracts ex
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empting property from exercise of the police power are not. But, as Justice Strong said, "the police power of the state is no more sacred than its taxing power." See 97 U. S. 678-679. The real "point" is whether a charter is a "contract" in the constitutional sense, or is mere legislation. You do not notice the Chicago Lake Front case. Can you explain on what principle it is incompetent for the state to contract away the public rights in Chicago's harbor, while it is competent for the state to contract away the public rights in the streets of Chicago or any other city? See 146 U. S. 387. In these later cases the Supreme Court has overruled the Dartmouth College case in principle—has furnished the reasoning on which it may finally be overruled in fact. I am surprised that you did not notice the preceding article on this same subject (in Independent for August 19), dealing with the improper influences which were used to bring about the decision in the Dartmouth College case, influences whose character and effectiveness are recognized by such eminent authority as Henry Cabot Lodge, Joseph Cotton, Jr., and John M. Shirley, from whom I quote. _ „ „ Jesse F. Orton. 73 Sixth street, Elmhurst, N. Y., October 15, 1909.
A REPLY 1. The Dartmouth College case asserted the doctrine that where the state is bound by contractual obligations protected by the Constitution not to disturb a grant previously made by charter, an act of the legislature which seeks to disturb the grant is null and void. We understood that Mr. Orton's purpose, in referring to the Charles River Bridge case (11 Peters 420), was to convey the notion that the legislature can substitute a narrower construction for that contemplated at the time of the original grant, thus modifying the rule that the original intention of the parties to the contract is binding on the legislature. We do not understand, however, this to have been the doctrine of the Bridge case. And in our opinion the Charles River Bridge case does not overrule the doctrine that a legislative act violating constitutional safeguards of contract is null and void. Perhaps a little more precision
of statement was desirable, but in aiming at condensation we were not guilty of misinter pretation. 2. It seems doubtful whether the Charles River Bridge case can accurately be said to have "trimmed the wings of the College decision" till it is conclusively shown that the Supreme Court, in that decision, impliedly rejected the view that a royal grant like that in the Dartmouth College patent would be construed in favor of the grantor. 3. State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop (16 How. 369) seems to us to have held, in effect, that a state cannot forever deprive itself of the power of taxation. Justice McLean, who wrote the opinion, said that an exemption from taxation made for the purpose "of advancing any policy connected with the public interest" is not an alienation, but an exercise of sovereignty (p. 389). This would imply that an exemption is virtually an ex
