Review of Periodicals If the deductions of this writer are sound and they are enforced by a. formidable collec tion of historical evidence—in the obscure medieval beginnings of the British polity there is no longer anyfioccasion for supposing that at any time the ‘ng may have been the solethe soverei of the superior alike to peopila1 and to kingdom, Parliament. Rather it is to be assumed that the people have always reserved olitical owers to themselves of which no 'll co d legally dis ssess them. This is what t e writer means y his theory of co-operative sovereignty. "The Norman Conquest provided a splen did opportunity for the kingly quest for abso lute rule. Viewed positively, the kingship was indeed a most powerful function, viewed relatively in conjunction with the ancient and unsurrendered claims of the community to participate in working out its own salva tion, and which eventually were slowly and surely made good, the kingship was nothing more than the principal ofiice in ‘the Crown.’ ' Legal Literature. “Blackstone's Commen taries." By Prof. A. V. Dicey, K.C. National Review, v. 54, p. 653 (Dec.). A richly informed article, setting forth the author's ripe reflections upon the influence of Blackstone upon legal literature and legal education, and written in a style much more than merely academic. The London Law Times di ests it as follows :— "He 5 ows when and why the popularity of the great work waned, and suggeststhe means by which critics of the present day may gain a due appreciation 0 its merits. The reception of the Commentaries was re markable. From the King himself (George III)
down to the humblest student of constitutional problems ranged the list of readers. For sixt
years the work maintained its
osition,
Pro essor Dicey thinks that the e ‘ting of Blackstone by Serjeant Stephen was the chief cause in the decline of its popularity. Stephen's regard for Blackstone restrained him from writing a new work, and the result
of the imposition of his logical faculty upon Blackstone's literary charm was unsatisfactory. ‘By virtue both of his knowledge of law and of his literary genius,’ wn'tes Professor Dicey, ‘Blackstone produced the one treatise on the laws of England which must for all time remain a art of English literature. . . . The united la ors of a thousand lawyers may create, and I trust will create, an encyclopaadia
of English law, but they will never, even though they have a Lord Chancellor at their head, give birth to a work which will rival the Commentaries on the Laws of England.’ Finally, Professor Dicey shows how the first Vinerian professor anticipated and marked out the path of reform in the teaching of the law which has been accomplished on both sides of the Atlantic. Kent s Commentaries is the onl
work which can rival Blackstone,
and the ane Professorshi of Law in Har vard University, held by oseph Story, was modeled upon the Vinerian professorship. It may be suggested that Professor Dicey
183
might perhaps have written a. word of eulogy
on‘the generosit
of Charles Viner, whose
benefaction ave
lackstone his 0 portunity,
and, it may
added, facilitated t e disposal
by Professor Dicey of his last learning in the service of the community for nearly thirty years." Legislative Powers. “The Due Process Clauses and ‘The Substance of Individual Rights.’ ” By Robert P. Reeder. 58 Univer sity of Pennsylvania Law Review 191 (Jan). In an acutely analytical article, based on an extended study of the decisions of the Supreme Court, the author, with admirable clearness
of reasoning, reaches the conclusion that the due process clause of the federal Constitu tion properly relates only to procedure, and not to substantive law. Hurtado v. Cali fornia (110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. 292) and other leading decisions are adversely com mented ugon. (Cf. article by Ex-Chief Justice Simeon . Baldwin, reviewed in 21 Green Bag 630.) It would follow from this position that the courts should have no power, if the uestion be considered urely as one of prin ciple, to declare a legi tive act unconstitu tional under the due process clause, merely because it was held to contravene social jus tice.
“Certainly it is the duty of the court, when interpreting provisions of the Constitution, to ascertain whether the terms had estab lished meanings when laced in the Constitu tion and, if so, to app y them in accordance with those meanings. And it seems clear that when the due rocess provision was placed in the federal onstitution it referred simply to those deprivations which are usually made by way of punishment, and that it re ferred simply to procedure. . . . There are abundant reasons for sayin with positive ness that the courts shoul hold that the provision relates only to procedure. . . .” Not unlike the "due process of law" doctrine, as re ards its practical operation, is Black
stone s doctrine of the "equity of the statute," according to which the court will look beyond the letter of the law to its reason and spirit and sustain it or hold it void accordingly:-— "A Very Frank and Honest Avowal of Judicial Heterodoxy." By Judge Edward S. Doolittle. 17 West Virginia Bar 15 (Jan). "Blackstone's exposition of the law, in this respect [as to the ‘equity of the statute'] has been assailed by numerous courts and text writers. That judge, who is one of these critics, will, in the trial of cases, probably, but inconsistentl with his own theory, do indirectly what lackstone affirms is within his lawful authority. "He will qualify the literal meaning of a harsh
and im olitic
statute,
or abate its
rigor, by his r ings upon the trial; by direct ing a verdict; by requiring the plaintiff to reduce the damages assessed by the jury; by setting aside the verdict; or b other means known by the experienced ju ge.
