m ._.
234
The Green Bag
development of equity in these urisdictions was highly imperfect and unsatisiactory. . . . On the contrary, the Chancery Court was cherished in the South from the beginning; and in fact the even and intelligent develop ment of the doctrines of e uity may be said to be a characteristic excellence of the juris prudence of the South during its entire history. . . . If it were not for the weakness of its equity juris rudence, we do not believe the title of assachusetts could be uestioned on the point of having the best roun ed system of judge-made law that is to be found in this country. . . . "The existence or non-existence in any state of a shapely and intelli ‘ble body of statutory law cannot but be a actor that will in the endllprove a potent one in its effect for good or i on the judiciary laws of that state. . . . The best illustration that occurs to the writer of the good consequences following from the existence of a healthy and intelligent body_ of statutory law is found in the law of the state of Alabama. . . . "While the new procedure may be all right from the point of view of the administration of substantive law, it is certainly justly chargeable with evil results upon the form of our law. It undoubtedly leads to length and discursive pleadings and to verbose an lon drawn out opinions. . . . While the reforme procedure may be all right in theory, the prac tical and successful adoption of it requires the existence of a strong bar and an able bench. . . . "One of the worst vices that ap ar to infect the body of law built up by the preme Court is a lack of candor on the part of the court in dealing with its own material. . . . It would sometimes appear that the more decisions the make on a particular topic, the greater 15 the difficulty of discovering what the law really is. . . . “Judicial opinions in this country are loaded with far too many details and are for the greater part too much lacking in the qualities of force and vigor. The 'udge who writes the opinion too often supp 'es us, or leaves behind, not only the finished product but all the waste material left over from his mental processes. . . . Our case law in this country does not compare very favorably, as regards its external form, with the case
law of England. Opinions delivered in Eng lish courts may be relied on generally to be spri htly and intelligible, and they will also be requently found to exemplify the inesti mable virtue of terseness. . . . "We need never expect . . . to see a body of case law in this large country as homo geneous as the English law is with itself. But it is possible that, notwithstanding local differences, each system should be consistent and reasonable in itself; and there is every reason to believe that as time goes on this better condition will be realized." Legal History. “Early History of the Serjeants and Their Apprentices." By Hugh H. L. Bellot. 35 Law Magazine and Review 138 (Feb.).
“These scanty notices of the serjeants and their apprentices enable us to trace back with some confidence, to an earlier
riod
than has commonly been assigned, the igher ggainch of the legal profession as an orgamzed y'll
Legal Literature. “The Lives of Law Books." By C. E. A. Bedwell. 35 Law Magazine and Review 129 (Feb.). “The writing of law books seems to become either an occupation in itself or else the joint undertaking of several hands rather than the expression of one master mind, who had a complete grasp of the theory and practice of the subject. The objection felt by many to the change has been expressed by Professor Dicey [in article in National Review, Dec. 1909; see 22 Green Bag 183].
“ ‘In the world of letters you cannot sub stitute co-operation for individuality. The united labors of a thousand lawyers may create, and I trust will create, an Encyclopadia of English law, but they will never, even though they have a Lord Chancellor at their head, give birth to a work which will rival the Commentaries on the Laws of England.’" Marriage and Divorce. “Shall Congress be Given Power to Establish Uniform Laws Upon the Subject of Divorce Among the States of the Union?" By Jennings C. Wise. 70 Central Law journal 93 (Feb. 4). "A careful study of the various grounds of divorce recognized in the different states will lead us to the conclusion that uncertainty of status does not result to such a degree from this as from the other forms of variance. . . . "No argument should be required to im press upon an intelligent mind the expediency of unification as to matters of jurisdiction and defense, for the abuses which the existin variance here leads to are manifest. . . . I divorce, as a legal institution, is to exist in one
form or another amongst our people, is it not desirable that a common and well-defined channel be staked out for those seeking its haven? Is it not eminently wise that the divorce court be circumscribed by uniform safeguards among our people, and shall we not establish a supreme tribunal to pronounce the sanction of dissolution from that most sacred of all our relations? "Surely the great weight of reason leads us to regard with favor the unification of our laws on the subject of divorce." "The Royal Commission on Divorce Law." By D. Oswald Dykes. 21 juridical Review 313 (Jan.).
"Rejecting desertion, the En lish law has only adultery as a ground 0 divorce. It may be doubtful whether there will be any strong movement in England to persuade the Commission to recommend divorce for de serfion. But it is almost certain that an attempt will be made to amend the law_of divorce for adultery. The present inequality consists in the fact that a wife can be divorced
