460
The Green Bag
An interesting quotation is furnished an act for the promotion of harmony upon an from a Massachusetts case on the important branch of the law. Simplicity and are ends especially to be sought. The proper method of interpreting the act : — clearness language of the act is to be construed with refer It is a matter of common knowledge that the Negotiable Instruments Act was drafted for the purpose of codifying the law upon the subject of negotiable instruments and making it uni form throughout the country through the adop tion by the legislatures of the several states and by the Congress of the United States. The design was to obliterate state lines as to the law govern ing instrumentalities so vital to the conduct of interstate commerce as promissory notes and bills of exchange, to remove the confusion or uncertainty which might arise from conflict of statutes or judicial decisions amongst the sev eral states, and to make plain, certain and gen eral the controlling rules of law. Diversity was to be moulded in uniformity. This act in sub stance has been adopted by many states. While it does not cover the whole field of negotiable instrument law, it is decisive as to all matters comprehended within its terms. It ought to be interpreted in such a way as to give effect to the beneficent design of the legislature in passing
ence to the object to be attained. Its words are to be given their natural and common meaning and the prevailing principles of statutory inter pretation are to be employed. Care should be taken to adhere as closely as possible to the obvious meaning of the act, without resort to that which had heretofore been the law of this commonwealth, unless necessary to dissolve obscurity or doubt, especially in instances where there was a difference in the law in the different states. Approaching the act from this point of view, it is apparent that no relation of principal and surety is established or contemplated by any of its sections. This appears to be the view taken wothout exception by the courts of other jurisdictions which have considered the point. In the inter pretation of a statute widely adopted by the states to the end of securing uniformity in a department of commercial law, we should be inclined to give weight to harmonious decisions of courts of other states, even if we were less
of a check and became in law and was in fact a check). Idaho (from Commissioner James E. Babb): Sheffield v. Cleland, 115 Pac. Rep. 21 (sec. 7, a reason able time within which to present a promissory note endorsed after maturity); Smith v. Field, 114 Pac. Rep. 668 (sec. 12, effect of certification of check is to fix the liability of the bank from the time of certification, irrespective of the date which the check bore); Shellenberger v. Nourse, 118 Pac. Rep. 508 (sec. 52 where a note was shown to have been obtained by fraud, the burden of proof shifted to the holder to show bona fides); Frost v. Harbert, 118 Pac. Rep. 1095 (a contract of guarantee that a note is good is a separate obligation of the guar antor and becomes absolute on the default of the maker of the note). Florida (from Commissioner Simonton): Taylor v. American Nat'l Bank, 57 So. Rep. 678 (a note is negotiable, though bearing interest and accom panied by a mortgage on real estate, which contains provision that upon default of payment of any installment of interest the whole amount of the note shall then be due). Virginia (from Commissioner Massie): City Nat'l Bank v. Hundley, 112 Va. 57 (touching sec. 56 on notice of defect); Reid's Adm'r v. Windsor, 17 Va. L. R. (touching sec. 24 on presumption of consideration). New York (from Commissioner Terry) : Pavenstedl v. New York Life Ins. Co., 203 N. Y. 91; Nat'l Park Bank v. Koehlcr, 204 N. Y. 174; Marts v. State Nat'l Bank, 131 N. Y. Supp. 1045; Mutter v. Kling, 149 App. Div. 176 (the N. I. L. is declara tory of the common law rules as they existed be
fore its enactment); St. Lawrence Co. Bank v. Waikins. 135 N. Y. Supp., 461 (as regards presumption of consideration for every negotiable instrument); Riddle v. Bank of Montreal, 130 N. Y. Supp. 15 (a bill of exchange payable on demand and drawn upon a bank is a check); Springs v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 130 N. Y. Supp. 87 (case of genuine draft with forged bill of lading attached); National Bank v. Kennedy, 45 App. Div. 669 (oral request over telephone not a presentment); Dumbrow v. Gelb, 130 N. Y. Supp. 182 (addition of words "with inter est" not permitted in filling up blank); Pavenstedt v. ff. Y. Life Ins. Co., supra (discusses doctrine of re-exchange as being damages); Martz v. State Nat'l Bank, supra (question of endorsement by joint payees and transfer of instrument where one payee dies); Nat'l Park Bank v. Koehler. supra (test as to discharge of an endorser by granting of an indulgence to the party primarily liable); Shattuck v. Guardian Trust Co., 204 N. Y. 200 (dis cusses sec. 326, providing that no bank shall be liable on a forged check unless notified of the forgery within one year after return to depositor); Stein v. Empire Trust Co., 133 N. Y. Supp. 517 (right of bank to cancel credit of check on discover ing payee's name was forged); Hodgens v. Jennings 133 N. Y. Supp. 584 (as to joint and several lia bility); Mutter v. Kling, supra (discusses facts necessary to make a draft an equitable assign ment of funds against which draft is drawn); Boer v. Hoffman, 135 N. Y. Supp. 28 (waiver of notice of dishonor is not waiver of presentment for pay ment); Lyons v. Union Exchange Nat'l Bank, 135 N. Y. Supp. 121 (question of certification of check); Columbia Distilling Co. v. Rech, 135 N. Y. Supp. 206 (question of material alteration).
