Latest Important Cases Interstate Commerce. Federal Safety Appliance Act Applies to Cars Other than Those Used in Moving Inter state Traffic. U. S. In Southern Railway Co. v. United States (L. ed. adv. sheets, p. 2), the Supreme Court held, sustaining the Dis trict Court for the Northern District of Alabama (164 Fed. Rep. 347), in an opinion filed October 30, that the Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stats. 531, chap. 196, as amended by the Act of March 2, 1903, 32 Stats. 943, chap. 976, applies to all locomotives, cars, and similar vehicles used on any railroad which is a highway of interstate commerce, whether actually in use in such commerce or not. We quote from the opinion, written by Mr. Justice Vandevanter: "We come, then, to the question whether these acts are within the power of Congress under the com merce clause of the Constitution, con sidering that they are not confined to vehicles used in moving interstate traffic, but embrace vehicles used in moving intra-state traffic. The answer to this question depends upon another, which is, Is there a real or substantial relation or connection between what is required by these acts in aspect of vehicles used in moving intra-state traffic and the object which the acts obviously are designed to attain, namely, the safety of interstate commerce and of those who are employed in its movement? Or, stating it in another way, Is there such a close or direct relation or con nection between the two classes of traffic, when moving over the same railroad, as to make it certain that the safety of the interstate traffic and of those who are employed in its movement will be pro moted in a real or substantial sense by applying the requirements of these
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acts to vehicles used in moving the traffic which is intra-state, as well as to those used in moving that which is interstate? If the answer to this ques tion, as doubly stated, be in the affirma tive, then the principal question must be answered in the same way. And this is so, not because Congress possesses any power to regulate intra-state com merce as such, but because its power to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and competently may be exerted to secure the safety of the persons and property transported therein and of those who are employed in such trans portation, no matter what may be the source of the dangers which threaten it. That is to say, it is no objection to such an exertion of this power that the dangers intended to be avoided arise, in whole or in part, out of matters connected with intra-state commerce." Irrigation. Irrigation Company may not Include Value of Water Rights in its Valuation made for Rate-Fixing Pur poses. U. S. That an irrigation canal company engaged in diverting water from a river and conveying it to the lands of distant owners for sale for irrigating purposes, is not the owner of the water carried or the water right created by its diversion, and is not entitled to have the value of such water right included as property by the carrier in the valuation of its property for rate-fixing purposes, is the broad doctrine laid down by United States Circuit Judge Morrow in refus ing the application of the San Joaquin Kings River Canal Irrigation Company for an injunction to restrain the enforce ment of certain rates fixed by the Boards of Supervisors of three counties in Cali fornia, for water for irrigating purposes. (San Joaquin & Kings River C. & I. Co. v. County of Stanislaus et al.)
